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FREEZING OUT BEN & JERRY: CORPORATE LAW AND
THE SALE OF A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ICON
Antony Page* & Robert A. Katz**
INTRODUCTION
The perfect duo. Ice cream and chunks. Business and social change. Ben
and Jerry.'
Nobody wants to end up like Ben and Jerry's, where soon after a
multinational acquired it, key facets of its social mission were cut from the
company.2
Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. was once the darling of proponents of
social enterprise and social entrepreneurship. 3 It was a for-profit corporation
that seemingly did not put profits first. Rather, it pursued, in the parlance, a
"double bottom" line, seeking to advance progressive social goals, while
still yielding an acceptable financial return for investors. It advanced its
social mission in many ways, such as by committing 7.5% of its profits to a
charitable foundation; conducting in-store voter registration; and buying
ingredients from suppliers who employed disadvantaged populations.4 Ben
& Jerry's founders, Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, held out their double
bottom line approach (they called it the "double-dip") as a model for others
who wished to "Lead With [their] Values and Make Money, Too."
The adulation dropped off significantly in 2000, when Ben & Jerry's
* Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
** Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis and Professor of
Philanthropic Studies at the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy.
t Thanks to the organizers of the symposium "Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other
Developments in Social Entrepreneurship," and the editors of this Article: Merrill Bent, Emily Montgomery
and Sofia Yazykova at the Vermont Law Review. Thanks also to research assistants Jonathan Lund and
Phillip Triplett.
1. BEN COHEN & JERRY GREENFIELD, BEN & JERRY'S DOUBLE DIP: LEAD WITH YOUR
VALUES AND MAKE MONEY, Too 13 (1997).
2. Kevin Jones, Selling vs. Selling Out, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV. OP. BLOG (Feb 27, 2009,
11:00 AM), http://www.ssireview.org/opinion/entry/sellingvssellingtout/.
3. See April Dembosky, Protecting Companies that Mix Profitability, Values, NPR MORNING
EDITION (Mar. 9, 2010), available at www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=124468487
(stating that the sale of Ben & Jerry's "helped set the stage for today's young, idealistic companies").
4. Id. at 60-63, 101, 110.
5. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1.
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was acquired by Unilever, a multi-national conglomerate.6 News of this sale
reportedly "sent shudders and shivers through the socially responsible
business community."7 It contributed to doubts about the long-term viability
of for-profit firms that pursue a double bottom line, sometimes known as
"for-profit social enterprises" or "hybrid enterprises."8  So it is that
"virtually every mission-driven entrepreneur knows the sad ending to the
tale of Ben & Jerry's: the forced sale of one of the country's premier
socially responsible businesses to a giant multinational clearly focused on
the financial bottom line." 9
Who lost Ben & Jerry's?' 0 How did this happen, and who or what was
responsible? Moving forward, what if anything should be done to protect
the missions of other socially-oriented for-profit enterprises?
Even now, a decade after the sale, Ben & Jerry's serves as a "case
study" for the perils of maintaining a social mission in the publicly-traded
corporate form." For some commentators, Ben & Jerry's denouement
demonstrates that the publicly-traded corporate form is inherently and
unavoidably biased towards profit-maximization.12 Corporate law, part of a
6. See generally, BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http//www.benjerry.com/company/
history/ (documenting the history of Ben & Jerry's social activism);Jon Entine, Ethical Brands - Turn On,
Tune In, Sell Out, ETHICAL CORPORATIONS, Oct. 2008, at 3.
7. JEFFREY HOLLENDER & STEPHEN FENICHELL, WHAT MATTERS MOST: HOW A SMALL
GROUP OF PIONEERS IS TEACHING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO BIG BUSINESS, AND WHY BIG BUSINESS
Is LISTENING 211 (2005).
8. For the purposes of this article we use the terms "for-profit social enterprise" or "hybrid
enterprises" to refer to businesses that have at least some private owner-investors (i.e. they are thus not
organized as nonprofit corporations, nor do they qualify as 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organizations), and that
are expressly committed to creating both social value and financial value for their private investors.
9. JILL BAMBURGH, GETTING TO SCALE: GROWING YOUR BUSINESS WITHOUT SELLING OUT
57 (2006) (emphasis added).
10. In 1949, following the victory of the Chinese Communists over the anti-communist
Chinese Nationalists, members of the media and Congress-including Senator Joseph McCarthy-
demanded to know "who lost China?" See Lloyd E. Eastman, Wh7o Lost China? Chiang Kai-Shek
Testifies, 88 THE CHINA Q. 658 (Dec. 1981).
I1. A standard version of the narrative:
Among social entrepreneurs, Unilever's purchase of Ben & Jerry's still serves as
a cautionary tale of how easily corporate fiat can undermine social responsibility.
"The board was legally required to sell to the highest bidder," says Jonathan
Storper, an attorney ... . Neither Ben Cohen nor Jerry Greenfield wanted to sell
the company, but because it was public, they had no choice. Both cofounders have
since expressed concerns that the company has shifted away from its original
mission of social responsibility.
Jenna Lawrence, Making the B List, STAN. Soc. INNovATION REv., Summer
2009, at 65, 66.
12. See Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Discussing Corporate Misbehavior: The Conflicting Norms of
Market, Agency, Profit and Loyalty, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 1213, 1235 (2004) ("While courts generally do
not require anything resembling a strong version of short-term profit-maximization, the market structure
in which publically traded corporations operate, and the ethos of our business and law schools, often do
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corporation's "immoral contract" with society, is a trap for unwary social
entrepreneurs, capable of overwhelming the most sincere efforts of
corporations to combine financial goals with a social mission. 14 According
to one prominent commentator on social enterprise, Ben & Jerry's board
"'decided,' at the point of a gun, to sell B&J to the highest bidder," such
that Ben Cohen's "enlightened leadership was outmatched by the structural
forces arrayed against him."15
This Article makes several claims. We reject the assertion that
corporate law compelled the sale-or sellout-of Ben & Jerry's to
Unilever. Admittedly, the publicly-traded corporate form inclines towards
profit-maximization. Even so, socially-oriented founders can take steps to
resist takeovers by others, including-if not especially-those who might
want to water down the pro-social mission. Indeed, Ben & Jerry's (as well
as the State of Vermont) took various measures to do precisely that in the
years before Unilever made its approach.16
When Unilever presented its offer to Ben & Jerry's board, it had two
options: accept the offer or vigorously attempt to thwart it-most notably
by testing the anti-takeover defenses and other liability shields already in
place. Accepting the offer would greatly enrich Ben & Jerry's shareholders
but increase the risk of diluting the company's social mission. The second
option-testing the anti-takeover measures and other potential sources of
protection-might have preserved the company's independence, but also
would have increased the founders' and other board members' exposure to
liability. This risk of exposure, we contend, was vanishingly small; the
board in general and Cohen and Greenfield in particular apparently
overestimated it.
We also distinguish between two major challenges to the long-term
survival of for-profit social enterprises: the first is the well-known threat of
unwanted takeovers by outsiders; the second is the potential diminution of
the founder's commitment to pursuing a double bottom line over time.
What steps can the founder take to protect the for-profit social enterprise
press managers in that direction.").
13. The quote is attributed to Ben & Jerry's board member Terry Mollner. See Marjorie Kelly,
The New Frontier for Ethical Leadership, in BUSINESS ETHics: NEW CHALLENGES FOR BUSINESS
SCHOOLS AND CORPORATE LEADERS 160, 163 (Robert A. Peterson & O.C. Ferrell eds., 2005).
14. Ben & Jerry's was not the only socially responsible business with iconic status to be
acquired by a multinational. Others include The Body Shop, Cascadian Farms, Green and Black's,
Stonyfield Farm, and Tom's of Maine, respectively acquired by L'Oreal, General Mills, Cadbury
Schweppes, Kellogg's, Danone, Coca-Cola, and Colgate. Entine, supra note 6, at 1-4.
15. MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE
ARISTOCRACY 147 (2001).
16. See infra Part II-C-H-E.
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she created from her own changing preferences? Could more effective pre-
commitment strategies be developed and made widely available to
prospective founders of for-profit social enterprises? If so, then there may
be an opportunity for organizational forms that make such enterprises more
durable.
We argue that although there is nothing inherently wrong with a well-
thought out corporate form for hybrid enterprises, it may be difficult to
think through all contingencies. This is the failure that resulted in the sale of
Ben & Jerry's, rather than the mandate of corporate law.
Lastly, we note that some of Ben & Jerry's distinctive social
characteristics are relatively hearty and have persisted even after the firm's
acquisition. The firm identified a neglected market niche for pro-social
commercial activity.' 7  It helped create more pro-social standards for
industry practice. These practices have endured and will likely endure, even
if the initial practitioner does not. Their persistence means that a formerly-
independent social enterprise can leave an enduring legacy of social value.
Moreover, there are social gains as a result of acquisition, insofar as the
social enterprise can do its good on a larger scale, and to the extent that the
acquiring entity adopts its innovative social technologies.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a short history of Ben
& Jerry's from beginning to end as an independent company, focusing on
what was perceived to make the company different. Part II discusses Ben &
Jerry's acquisition by Unilever and considers the claim that this sale was
compelled by corporate law. This claim, we argue, rests on doubtful legal
and factual analyses. If this claim is in fact correct, it is only because Ben &
Jerry's directors made readily avoidable mistakes, both at the time of the
sale and fifteen years earlier. Part III looks at the consequences of the sale
and draws conclusions for present day entrepreneurs. By agreeing to be
17. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., REFERENCE FOR BuSINESS: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BUSINESS, 2ND ED., http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/businesses/A-F/Ben-Jerry-s-Homemade-Inc.html
(last visited Sept. 5, 2010) ("Cohen and Greenfield started a revolution in the food business when they
decided to give a percentage of company profits to charitable organizations, usually associated with social
causes and the environment.").
18. Jack Neff, It's Not Easy Being P.C: Funding Anti-Globalization Protestors Is One Price
Unilever Pays For Ben & Jerry's, FOOD PROCESSING, Feb. 1, 2002, at 18 (explaining that after acquisition
by Unilever, "[slocial mission campaigns now come with social objectives and metrics in addition to
marketing goals," and detailing Ben & Jerry's campaign to reduce "tonnage of greenhouse gas emissions by
collecting pledges from consumers and businesses to reduce their output by specific amounts"). See also
Hays, supra note 18, at Cl (quoting Rosanne Haggerty, Director of Common Ground Community, which
operates a Ben & Jerry's retail outlet in Manhattan, as saying, "I wish the company could have stayed
independent .... But I'm cheered that they have created a mechanism to not just preserve the values that
have made Ben & Jerry's special, but to expand them. In a strange way, this could be a validation of all
those quirky values").
214 [Vol. 35:211
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acquired by Unilever, Ben & Jerry's may have advanced its social mission
more effectively than it could have done on its own. Finally, in Part IV we
identify some lessons that today's social entrepreneurs can draw from Ben
& Jerry's experience.
I. THE PERFECT Duo
Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. produced gourmet ice cream with
creative names ("Cherry Garcia" was an early classic) and awesome
flavors,' 9 all wrapped in unbleached paperboard and progressive causes like
world peace (a.k.a. "Whirled Peace."). 20 Until its acquisition in 2000 by
Unilever, the world's biggest ice cream maker, it was a relatively small
company that had achieved "iconic status as [a] socially progressive
brand[]."21
A. Humble Beginnings
The story of Ben & Jerry's beginnings is legendary, almost mythical.
Cohen and Greenfield, old school chums and former hippies, were casting
around for an inexpensive business.22 Greenfield had failed to get into
medical school, and Cohen had failed to graduate from several
universities. 23 They had in mind "a way . .. to work together without having
to work for someone else," 24 and "something that would be 'fun.' 25
Initially, they had considered selling bagels, but the cost of a proper oven
was out of reach.26 Ice cream was something of an afterthought, prompted it
seems by the availability from Pennsylvania State University of a $5
correspondence course on how to make ice cream.27
19. See, e.g., BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http*//www.benjerry.com/flavors/ourflavors/#
(Sept 24, 2010) (listing their current 47 flavors, including old favorites like Chunky Monkey, banana ice cream
with fudge chunks and walnuts).
20. See Ben & Jerry's Launches Whirled Peace, CONE, httpl//www.coneinc.com/ben-and-jenys-
launches-imagine-whirled-peace (last visited Sept.5, 2010) (explaining Ben & Jerry's promotion of its
"whirled peace" flavored ice cream commemorated John Lennon and Yoko Ono's famous "Bed-in for
Peace" demonstration and how Ben & Jerry's donated $20,000 to the Student Peace Alliance and the Peace
Camp Initiative).
21. James E. Austin & Herman B. Leonard, Can the Virtuous Mouse and the Wealthy Elephant
Live Happily Ever After?, 51 CAL. MGMT. REV. 77, 77 (2008).
22. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 15-16.
23. Id. at 14.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Ben Cohen & Jerry Greenfield: Caring Capitalists, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 10, 2008),
http-//www.entrepreneur.com/article/197626 [hereinafter Caring Capitalists].
26. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 15-16.
27. Penn State no longer offers this course. Its College of Agricultural Sciences currently offers a
2010] 215
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They incorporated Ben & Jerry's Homemade in 1977 and began
serving gourmet ice cream (known as "super-premium" in the industry)
from a renovated gas station in May of 1978.28 They had $12,000 in start-up
capital-$6,000 in savings, $2,000 borrowed from a family member, and a
$4,000 loan guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA)." In
1980 they secured another SBA loan to manufacture ice cream in pint
containers for retailers. 30
Their initial goals were modest. Both wanted to avoid becoming
employees, particularly as Cohen had not proved to be a good one. 3 1 They
also had naive notions that in due course "[t]he business would run itself."3 2
As people who had grown up in the sixties they were also looking for
something more, reflected in the company's motto that "[i]f it's not fun,
why do it?"33 As Greenfield put it, his early goal was simply to "spread joy"
in the community.34 They also shared the modest dream of earning $20,000
35
a year.
Success came quickly. In 1981, they franchised their first
store, which was followed soon after by a Time magazine
cover story that led with "[w]hat you must understand at
the outset is that Ben & Jerry's, in Burlington, Vt., makes
the best ice cream in the world."36 In 1983, their first
franchise outside of Vermont opened in Portland, Maine.
seven day "Ice Cream Short Course" every January ("the slowest time for the ice cream industry") that teaches
"the ins and outs of ice cream manufacturing" and where "knowledgeable instructors take you from 'Cow to
Cone."' See Ice Cream Short Course, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIvERSYTY, http//foodscience.psu.edu/worksho
ps/ice-cream-short-course (last visited Sept 15, 2010) ("Penn State's Ice Cream Short Course is the oldest,
best-known, and largest educational program dealing with the science and technology of ice cream. It also is
believed to be the first continuing education course in the United States.").
28. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 10-K) 3 (filed Mar. 22, 2000), at 3 [hereinafter Annual Report
2000].
29. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 91-92.
30. Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by
Modem Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1625, 1638 (1993).
31. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 14 (describing Mr. Cohen as "unredeemably
unemployable").
32. Id. at 18.
33. Murray Raphael, What's the Scoop on Ben & Jerry?, ALL BUSINESS (Aug. 1, 1994),
http://allbusiness.com/marketing/direct-marketing/454093-1.html.
34. FRED LAGER, BEN & JERRY'S: THE INSIDE ScooP: How Two REAL Guys BUILT A
BUSINESS WITH A SOCIAL CONSCIENCE AND A SENSE OF HUMOR (1994). For the promotional material
advertising the first free cone day in 1979, Cohen wrote "Business has a responsibility to give back to
the community from which it draws its support." COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 20.
35. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 15.
36. Janice C. Simpson et al., Ice Cream: They All Scream For It, TIME, Aug. 10, 1981,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954909,00.html. The article went on to
contradict itself with several other ice cream stores also selling the world's (or even universe's) best ice
[Vol. 35:211216
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B. From Early Success to Social Enterprise
Ben & Jerry's transformation into a social enterprise icon began in
1982.8 By then, Cohen and Greenfield realized that the business would not
run itself. Instead of having fun by making and scooping ice cream, Cohen
recalls, they were "hiring and firing, dealing with lawyers and accountants
and correspondence, and trying to do the books." 39 They were preparing to
sell the business-until Cohen had a light bulb moment. In explaining his
disenchantment to an acquaintance, "an eccentric restaurateur," 0 Cohen
said that Ben & Jerry's is "just a business that, like all others, exploits its
workers and the community."' The acquaintance responded, "You don't
have to run your business that way.. . . If there's something you don't like
about the business, change it."42 According to Fred Lager, a former
President of Ben & Jerry's, "[t]he conversation marked the beginning of
Ben's efforts to run what he termed a socially conscious business."43 Prior
to then, says Cohen, the idea of changing the way business works "hadn't
occurred to [them]."44 Later, Cohen described it as "an experiment to see if
it was possible to use the tools of business to repair society."45 That
September, he apprised the company's staff for the first time that he
intended "to create a business that gave something back to the
community, 4 and Ben & Jerry's was on the way to becoming one of
America's first and most successful prototypes for for-profit social
enterprises.47
Cohen's realization that he did not have to run a conventional business
also served to take Ben & Jerry's off the auction block. In March 1982,
Cohen and Greenfield had listed their company with Country Business
Services, a broker of small businesses. 8 After the brokers had found a
cream. Id.
37. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., supra note 17 ("1983: The first out-of-state franchise
scoop shop opens in Portland, Maine.").
38. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 24.
39. Ben Cohen, On Becoming an Ecopreneur, in THE GREEN FESTIVAL READER: FRESH IDEAS
FROM AGENTS OF CHANGE 51(Kevin Danaher & Alisa Gravitz eds., 2008).
40. Id.
41. LAGER, supra note 34, at 57.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Cohen, supra note 39, at 51.
45. Id.
46. LAGER, supra note 34, at 62.
47. See Caring Capitalists, supra note 25. This article, however, dates the transformation
towards a socially conscious business to 1984 rather than 1982.
48. LAGER, supra note 34, at 54.
2010] 217
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buyer, Cohen refused to go through with the deal.49 In the subsequent
breach of contract suit, not only did Ben & Jerry's lose, but the jury
awarded the broker punitive damages, which is extremely unusual in a
contract action.o Cohen dryly observed that the jury "found us really, really
guilty."5
Cohen and Greenfields' social values influenced how they chose to
expand the company. When the company next wanted to raise money, they
were careful. In 1984, the company did a stock offering, available only to
Vermont residents, to raise money for a new plant.5 2 They chose the public
offering instead of seeking venture capital, which their investment bankers
advised, because they feared that venture financing posed a greater threat to
their continued control over the company.13
By that time, moreover, they wanted the company to devote more
resources to addressing social issues and believed that greater financial
success would increase the money available for corporate philanthropy.5 4
As they put it:
[W]e believed that business was a machine for making money.
Therefore we thought the best way to make Ben & Jerry's a force
for progressive social change was to grow bigger so we could
make more profits and give more money away. We'd decided to
give away 10 percent of our profits every year. Ten percent of the
profits of a $100 million company could do a lot more good than
10 percent of the $3 or $4 million we were currently doing.5 5
49. Id. at 56.
50. Id. at 73. Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "[p]unitive damages are not
recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which
punitive damages are recoverable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979). Typically,
the breach must constitute an "independent and willful tort accompanied by fraud, malice, wantonness
or oppression." See, e.g., McIntosh v. Magna Systems, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(explaining what is needed for recovery of punitive damages in a breach of contract claim in Illinois).
51. LAGER, supra note 34, at 76.
52. Id. at 90. They were unable to obtain a bank loan for the expansion. By keeping the
offering Vermont-only they were able to avoid certain federal securities requirements, including the
need for detailed historical financial statements that they had not prepared. Id. at 93.
53. Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1581, 1607-08 (2006); LAGER, supra note 34, at 90 ("The biggest drawback of soliciting
venture capital was the potential for losing control of the business. As a precondition of their investment,
most venture capitalists have input into how the business is managed, and they're apt to take over if
things start going poorly.").
54. Their "philanthropy" to this point arguably consisted of not much more than the free ice-
cream they would occasionally give away. See, e.g., BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, supra
note 6 (marking each anniversary with a free cone day).
55. See COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 94. Years later but while still independent,
Cohen looking at the changes to the company would sometimes complain that "[g]rowing is dying." See
218 [Vol. 35:211
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They also thought they could create a bond between their customers
and the company by allowing those from the community, who had been
loyal to them from the beginning, a chance to invest in the company (or as
they put it, "to spread the wealth").16 Unlike most road shows consisting of
dry financial information and projections, they gave away free pints of ice
cream along with their prospectus.s7 The offering itself raised $750,000,
with nearly 1% of Vermont households becoming shareholders."
A year later, they did a national public offering and listed Ben &
Jerry's on NASDAQ, in order to both get capital to further expand their
production facilities and create more liquidity for their existing
shareholders.59 They also started selling the product outside New England
and established a plant and their headquarters in Waterbury, Vermont.o
This plant has since gone on to become one of Vermont's most visited
tourist attractions.6 ' The company was sufficiently successful for the
founders to formalize the company's charitable donation policy. They
established the Ben & Jerry's Foundation, endowed it with 50,000 of
Cohen's shares worth about $850,000, and committed to funding it with
7.5% of the company's pre-tax profits.62
As Ben & Jerry's became more successful, they began to develop an
approach "dedicated to a sustainable corporate concept of linked
prosperity." Unlike most other companies believed to pursue only
profits-i.e. a financial bottom line-Ben & Jerry's pursued a "double
bottom line.""6 It measured its own success by asking: "How much have we
Caring Capitalists, supra note 25.
56. LAGER, supra note 34, at 90-91.
57. Fleischer, supra note 53, at 1611.
58. See COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 98 (1997) ("Nearly one in every hundred
Vermont families-about eighteen hundred households-bought stock.").
59. See id. at 100-01.
60. See BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/company/history/
(click on 1985 icon at bottom of screen) (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
61. BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http/www.benjerry.com/sear/1999-ceres/page3.cfm
(last visited Sept. 6,2010).
62. See COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 101. The figure apparently was lowered from
10% to 7.5% at the insistence of their financial advisors. Id. The Foundation's employee-led grant
making committee essentially funded projects that fit their particular agenda. Many of these causes
relate to environmental issues but also included causes like fair trade or community focused projects on
homelessness. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 1652-53.
63. BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/mission-
statement (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
64. Ben & Jerry's is one of the earliest U.S. companies to refer to the double bottom line. Its popular
meaning is "a business term used in socially responsible enterprise and investment. While all businesses have a
conventional bottom line to measure their fiscal perfornance-financial profit or loss-enterprises which seek
a second bottom line look to measure their performance in terms of positive social impact." Double Bottom
Line, WIKIPEDIA, httpJ/en.wildpedia.org/wiki/Double-bottom line (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (emphasis
2010] 219
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improved the quality of life in the community? And how much profit is left
over at the end of each month. If we haven't contributed to both those
objectives, we have failed." 65 By 1988, they were ready to issue a three-part
mission statement based on social, product, and economic facets.66 The goal
was to achieve this while "holding a deep respect for individuals inside and
outside the Company and for the communities of which they are a part."
Ben & Jerry's also joined various organizations that promoted business
responsibility, including the Social Venture Network, Business for Social
Responsibility, and Vermont Businesses for Social Responsibility. By
1992, Worth Magazine could write of the company, "[it] has done some
marvelous things."
Ben & Jerry's business decisions frequently reinforced the company's
social mission and, at least by its own report, improved the company's
financial condition.70 From the beginning, their packaging emphasized their
commitment to Vermont ("Vermont's Finest"). They supported the
Vermont economy by buying their milk and cream from local family
farms.7 1 As organic milk became available, they traded organic milk
72produced in New York for organic milk produced in Vermont.
Many of these business decisions have focused on an environmental
mission:73 feeding waste to pigs (1987); speaking out against bovine growth
hormone and using only milk that was free of artificial growth hormone
added).
65. Ben Cohen, On Becoming an Ecopreneur, NEW AMERICA MEDIA, http//namonline.com/news/
viewarticle.htmlarticle id-c8a239dde5e243d8a8b8efl852da2574 (last updated Sept. 8, 2008).
66. Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at 1. Ben & Jerry's mission statement included "a
'product mission,' 'to make, distribute and sell the finest quality all natural ice cream'; an 'economic
mission,' 'to operate the Company on a sound financial basis ... increasing value for our shareholders
and creating career opportunities and financial rewards for our employees'; and a 'social mission,' 'to
operate the Company in a way that actively recognizes the central role that business plays in the
structure of society by initiating innovative ways to improve the quality of life of a broad community:
local, national and intemational."' Id. (alteration in original).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Allan Sloan, The Selling of the Simple Life, WORTH MAG., Feb.-Mar. 1992, at 80.
70. In Ben & Jerry's final annual report, the company reported that it "believes that
implementation of its social mission, which is integrated into the Company's business, has been
beneficial to the Company's overall financial performance." Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at 22.
The report also cautioned that there may be limits: "it is possible that at some future date the amount of
the Company's energies and resources devoted to its social mission could have some material adverse
financial effect." Id.
71. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Solicitation Recommendation Statement (Schedule
14D-9), at 15 (April 18, 2000) [hereinafter Solicitation Recommendation Statement] (stressing Ben &
Jerry's commitment to synthetic hormone-free Vermont dairy products). Ironically, much of their early
production came from New Hampshire farms. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 57.
72. See Solicitation Recommendation Statement, supra note 71.
73. See generally Solomon, supra note 30, at 1653-54.
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(1989);74 successfully litigating for the right to label its products "rBGH
free" in Illinois (1997);75 developing "Eco-pint" containers that use
unbleached paperboard because of concerns about chlorine and water
pollution (1998);76 using more Fair-Trade certified and organic ingredients;
and reducing company's output of waste.n
Other business decisions emphasized the company's commitment to
people and the community. For its "Chocolate Fudge Brownie" ice cream,
Ben & Jerry's purchased brownies from Greyston Bakery, an entity whose
"mission is to provide employment and support services to former
homeless, low-income and disenfranchised people and their families," and
which applies profits to housing programs, child care, and so forth.78 "It's
no stretch to say," according to Ben & Jerry's (perhaps stretching the
matter a bit), "that when you eat our Chocolate Fudge Brownie ice cream,
you're striking a blow for economic and social justice."7 9 The company also
paid a premium to Vermont's dairy farmers despite a volatile dairy market
and the withdrawal of government dairy subsidies.80 Another strategy was
to create special flavors to help benefit charities or suppliers-most notably
"Rainforest Crunch," which used Brazil nuts grown in rainforests by
indigenous people.81 They also substituted a cookie for the Oreos they
74. BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, supra note 6 (click on 1989). Others shared Ben
& Jerry's opposition to milk produced with the use of artificial growth hormones. See Shandra Martinez,
Consumers Drive Change to Hormone-Free Milk, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Feb. 15, 2008, at Cl,
available at 2008 WLNR 3157127 (discussing additional suppliers who switched to hormone-free milk
in response to consumer demand).
75. See Chunky Monkey Puts You in the Know, VEGETARIAN TIMES, Nov. 1997, http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0820/is-n243/ai_19986666/.
76. Ben & Jerry's Announces Environmentally-Friendly Packaging Innovation; Company
Offers to Share 'ECO-Pint'Information, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 18, 1999 (reporting that the company was
eagerly sharing its "hot new packaging idea" with other companies as part of its social mission).
77. See Progress on Our Commitments, UNILEVER.COM, http://www.unilever.com/images/
sdProgresson ourcommitments.tcml3-216546.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
78. Our Flavors profile of Chocolate Fudge Brownie Ice Cream, BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE
ICE CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/inside-the-pint/greyston/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). See
also GREYSTON FOUNDATION, http://www.greyston.org/index.php?whowe_are (last visited Sept. 05,
2010) (stating that when hiring people, the bakery does not "hire people to make brownies," but rather,
"make[s] brownies in order to hire people" and that those hired "are considered to be 'hard to employ"').
79. Inside the Pint-Greyston Bakery, BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM,
http://www.benjerry.com/activism/inside-the-pint/greyston/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2010).
80. Elizabeth Kolbert, An "Inspirational" Ice Cream Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at
A16. In a perhaps less savory development, Ben & Jerry's arguably played to xenophobic fears by
portraying Haagen-Dazs as a foreign intruder that did not reflect the local, community-based values of
Ben and Jerry's. See Calvin Trillin, Competitors, NEW YORKER, July 8, 1985, at 31 (citing Ben &
Jerry's questioning "WHAT'S THE DOUGHBOY AFRAID OF?"). In truth, Hdagen-Dazs was created
in New York, albeit by a Polish immigrant. Id.
81. This is not to claim that all of their initiatives had the desired effect. For example, a large
percentage of the Brazil nuts used in Rainforest Crunch were bought from conventional suppliers, and
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originally used in order to stop doing business with R Reynolds Nabisco, a
company that sold cigarettes.82
Ben & Jerry's also followed several unusual and creative business
practices, claiming in a securities filing that it "embraces a philosophy that
manifests itself in these attributes: being real and 'down to earth,' being
humorous and having fun, being non-traditional and alternative and, at
times, being activists around progressive values." For example, when the
Grateful Dead's lawyers challenged the Cherry Garcia flavor, the company
negotiated a licensing agreement where the royalties went to charity.8
When they needed a new CEO, they ran a national campaign, "Yo! I'm
Your CEO!" inviting anyone to apply.85 They also registered voters and
solicited members for the Children's Defense Fund in their scoop shops.86
Moreover, they rarely used traditional methods of advertising, since in the
early years conventional media was too expensive for them. Rather, their
support for social and environmental causes invariably generated attention
from the press, garnered public interest, and made them cult heroes for
various demographics." They also used their ice cream cartons to advertise
and explain the various social causes they supported, such as their
vehement opposition to bovine growth hormones, and support of rainforest
preservation or One Percent for Peace. Some consumers may have thought
the increase in demand and subsequent overproduction apparently resulted in the indigenous rain forest
farmers being forced to sell their lands to developers. Marianne Jennings & Jon Entine, Business with a
Soul: Reexamination of What Counts in Business Ethics, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 43-45
(1998) (concluding that the "Ben & Jerry's program actually exacerbated the very problem it was
purported to address").
82. Ben Cohen, My Life With Oreos, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 13, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/ben-cohen-ben-andjerys/my-life-with-oreos/.
83. Annual Report 2000, supra note 28 at 1.
84. Tim Golden, It Is Money Battles Like These that Make the Dead Truly Grateful, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1997, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/02/weekinreview/it-is-money-battles-like-
these-that-make-the -dead-truly-grateful/html.
85. They ended up selecting a candidate, Robert Holland, who was identified by the executive
search firm. See, e.g., Jerry Ackerman, Holland Resigns At Ben & Jerry's Urges Marketing Specialist
Should Be Next To Take Helm, BosTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 1996, at Fl. Holland resigned 18 months later,
apparently never having been at ease "with the founders' clowning and campaigning." Raspberry
Rebels, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 1997, at 61. Holland was replaced with Perry Odak-a choice that
was questioned because of Odak's role as chief operating officer at the company that made Winchester
rifles. Id.
86. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, When Products Are Tied to Causes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,1992, § I, at 33,
available at http-/www.nytimes.comi/199204/18/business/when-products-are-tied-to-causes.html.
87. Hanna Rosin, The Evil Empire: The Scoop on Ben and Jerry's Crunchy Capitalism, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 11, 1995, at 22.
88. One Percent for Peace was an organization founded by Ben Cohen that supported rerouting
one percent of the U.S. defense budget towards peaceful activities. See COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra
note 1, at 203-04.
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that buying Ben & Jerry's ice cream directly contributed to worthy causes
and was akin to a charitable donation.89
Ben & Jerry's was also committed to paying its employees a living
wage and generous benefits,90 including being one of the first companies to
offer health care benefits to employees' same sex partners.91 They followed
a compressed payroll policy-i.e. the company's highest-paid person could
earn no more than five times the lowest paid person.92 The figure was first
increased to seven times, and then abandoned in 1994 in order to attract
more qualified senior executives.93 Yet, trade-offs among social missions
were unavoidable, and some employees complained that the company
skimped on their wages and working conditions in order to finance its
charitable contributions to third parties. 94
Throughout these years and into the early 1990s, sales grew
impressively each year.95 During this same period, they also did well in
their market niche, and by 1997 they had garnered 39% of the American
market for super-premium ice cream, compared with 43% for Hdiagen-
Dazs.96
89. Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting Claims
Underlying Socially Responsible Investing, 57 BUS. LAW. 681, 689 (2002) (explaining that socially
responsible investing is "investment, not charity").
90. Livable Wage, BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http//www.benjeny.com/activism/
peace-and-justice/livable-wagel (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). Benefits included profit sharing, health club
memberships, day care, and tuition assistance. See Caring Capitalists, supra note 25 (listing the employee
benefits in addition to ice cream). These policies did not, however, prevent a successful union organization
effort in a department of one plant Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at 10. The employment policies have
survived the takeover, such that the average wage in Vermont was $13.25 per hour in 2008, at a time when the
prevailing state minimum wage was $7.68. See SEAR Report, 2008, BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM,
http//www.benjenycompany.com/company/sear/2008/searO8-9.0.cfm (last visited Sept 7, 2010). Regarding
benefits, according to Vault, Ben & Jerry's offers "[d]ependant care benefits, Domestic partner benefits,
Paternity and Maternity leave, Adoption aid, Health club memberships, and Three free pints of ice cream per
day." Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc., VAULT, httpJ/www.vault.com/companies/company_main.jspco page=
2&product_id=649&chid=301&v-2&tabnum-=2 (last visited Sept. 2, 2010).
91. James P. Baker, Equal Benefits for Equal Work? The Law ofDomestic Partner Benefits,
14 LABOR LAWYER 23, 51 (1998)
92. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 184.
93. Maria Shau, Ben & Jerry's Grows Up, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 1994, at 65, available at
1994 WLNR 2030405. See generally, Linda Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective
Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L. J. 59 (Winter, 1992). The seven-to-one ratio was a
bit misleading, as the figures compared were only base salaries and did not include stock options.
Indeed, by 1999 total executive compensation had increased to near sixteen-to-one. WILLIAM B.
WERTHER & DAVID CHANDLER, STRATEGIC CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: STAKEHOLDERS IN A
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 140 (2006).
94. See COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 177 (quoting an employee who thought "they
could do more for their employees before they look outside").
95. LAGER, supra note 34, at 224-25. Ben & Jerry's lost money for the first time in 1994,
prompting the search for a new CEO. Raspberry Rebels, supra note 85.
96. Id
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Ben & Jerry's identified untapped demand for ice cream that catered to
the consumers' social and ethical sensibilities and was able to earn profits
by selling it.97 By 1999, Ben & Jerry's ranked first in a Harris poll on the
public's perceptions of the "social responsibility" of U.S. businesses. Ben
& Jerry's social mission was not just "a drag on its commercial aspirations:
after all, some of its customers shell out the extra cash for Rainforest
Crunch precisely because it is chock full of righteously harvested nuts from
tribal cooperatives in the Amazon."99 From a social perspective it was doing
good, but from a financial perspective, was it doing well?
C. Successful Social Enterprise to Stockmarket Stagnation
A hybrid business pursues a double bottom line-profits and people.
Although Ben & Jerry's social initiatives continued and arguably thrived
throughout the 1990s,10 their previously stellar financial performance
suffered.'0o In 1992, initial investors in Ben & Jerry's owned stock worth
fifteen times what they had paid. 02 The shares hit $33.75 in 1993.103 By
1999, the stock was languishing at $17, and, in the words of a Prudential
Securities Analyst, "[t]he stock had done nothing for the past 10 years."
The stock performance resulted from the company's financial performance,
and the company had suffered its first financial loss in 1994.105 Financial
performance resulted from what was, by the mid-1990s, relatively slow
sales growth.'0 6 Likewise, the company's return on capital was relatively
97. See Austin & Leonard, supra note 21, at 83 (characterizing the founders as "pioneers in
creating products that did not exist in the marketplace, but were perceived by the entrepreneurs to be
socially valuable").
98. Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at 6.
99. Raspberry Rebels, supra note 85. See, e.g., Sankar Sen et al., Withholding Consumption: A
Social Dilemma Perspective on Consumer Boycotts, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 399, 400 (2001) (demonstrating
that some consumers will pay more for products produced by a more virtuous company).
100. Hanna Rosin, supra note 87, at 22.
101. Id.
102. Sloan, supra note 69, at 80.
103. Mary Ellen Kuhn, Ben & Jerry's suffers some growing pains, FOOD PROCESSING, Sept. 1,
1994, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/manufactoring/food-manufactoring/474789-1.html.
104. Buyout Sweet Enough for Ben & Jerry's Founders; Ability to Pursue Social Causes Key
Factor in Deal, THE PANTAGRAPH, May 12, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WLNR 4343876 [hereinafter
Buyout Sweet Enough] (quoting JeffKanter, who added, "'Something had to be done' to give Ben & Jerry's
shareholders a better return on their investment"). See also Richard McCaffrey, In the Hunt for Ben &
Jerry's, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Dec. 2, 1999, http://www.fool.com/news/1999/quicknews991202.htm (stating
that the company's return on equity was "lousy by any measure" and arguing that it "has to find ways to
create value").
105. Raspberry Rebels, supra note 85. The company still donated more than a quarter of a
million dollars to charity that year. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 276.
106. Raspberry Rebels, supra note 85.
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low-about 5% in 1996.107 Growth prospects appeared weak, as Americans
paid more attention to health concerns over fatty foods like ice cream.'0o As
the Economist wrote in 1997, Ben & Jerry's had "slushy results."'" The
Motley Fool, a website that sought to represent Main Street, griped that the
company's stock had "underperformed the market's historical average
during the greatest bull run in the stock market history. That's unacceptable
any way you slice it.""10 Naturally, some investors believed that the
company should relax its commitment to social values and focus on
delivering more profit. The Motley Fool argued that the policy of donating
7.5% of profits to charity had "lost its luster when the company failed to
deliver reasonable results to its long-term investors.""' The Economist
chided that "[e]ven caring shareholders would rather that Ben & Jerry's
gave its profits to charity than becoming a charity itself."ll 2
Although the company itself acknowledged the potential for conflict-
"it is possible that at some future date the amount of the Company's
energies and resources devoted to its social mission could have some
material adverse financial effect"-as late as 1999, it did not believe that
date had come." 3  Regardless, however, of the real or perceived financial
impact of Ben & Jerry's social programs, investors could see that the stock
was not performing well.
D. The End of Independence
Ben and Jerry's mediocre stock gains had attracted buyout interest and
offers since at least 1998, when Dreyer's, a competing ice cream
manufacturer, had offered to buy the company.1 4 In early 2000, Cohen
responded to takeover rumors by leading a group of social investors in an
107. Id.
108. Id. Ben & Jerry's responded by unveiling frozen yogurt with "butterfat content between one
and five percent [as] opposed to the 17 percent butterfat levels in the regular ice cream." Ben & Jerry 's
Homemade, Inc. - Company History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/Ben-amp;-Jerrys-Homemade-Inc-Company-History.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2010). By 1992,
Ben & Jerry's yogurt sales "were accounting for 15 to 18 percent of the company's revenues" and
ultimately made the company "the leader in the super premium yogurt market." Id.
109. Raspberry Rebels, supra note 85 ("You might think that such slushy results [e.g., modest
growth of sales; net loss one year; submarket return on equity] are less worrying for Ben & Jerry's than
they would be for other, more conventional companies.. . . Surely if any firm could breeze along
enjoying a moderately profitable but socially responsible existence it would be this one?").
110. Rob Walker, The Scoop on Ben & Jerry's Sellout, SLATE, April 12, 2000, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/1005081 (quoting Motley Fool).
I 11. Id.
112. Raspberry Rebels, supra note 85, at 62.
113. Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at 22.
114. Shau, supra note 93.
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attempted leveraged buyout of the company at $38 a share, about double
what the stock had been trading for a few months earlier." The group, Hot
Fudge Partners, included Cohen and Meadowbrook Lane Capital, an
"investment bank [that] serves businesses that value social
responsibility.""'6 Although it was reported that the board accepted this
offer,' this seems doubtful 18 Dreyer then offered a $38 per share all
stock deal, which in turn prompted international conglomerate Unilever to
bid $43.60."9 On April 11, 2000, the Ben & Jerry's board announced that it
had accepted Unilever's offer and signed the merger agreement.120 The last
remaining step was a shareholders' vote, after which Ben & Jerry's became
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Unilever.12' Ben & Jerry's had remained
independent for just a little more than twenty years.
The announcement generated considerable criticism,122
notwithstanding Unilever's claim that it was "in an ideal position to bring
the Ben & Jerry's brand, values and socially responsible message to
consumers worldwide." 23 Scoop shop franchisees were generally opposed,
taking such action as organizing rallies against the sale. 24 Many consumers
115. Jim Steiker & Michael Golden, Hot Fudge Partners: Insiders Tell How Social Investors
Tried to (but Couldn't) Buy Ben & Jerry's, BUSINESS ETHICS, May-June 2000, at 7.
116. See MEADOWBROOK LANE, http://www.meadowbrooklane.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
Meadowbrook Lane included investors like Anita Roddick, founder of the Body Shop, another
prominent for-profit social enterprise that was bought by a multinational. Constance L. Hays, Investment
Group Makes Bidfor Ben & Jerry's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at Cl.
117. Constance L. Hays, Ben & Jerry's is Reportedly Going Private, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29,2000, at
Cl, available at httpJ/www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/business/the-market-place-ben-jerry-s-is-reportedly-
going-private.html [hereinafter Hays, Going Private] (reporting that a shareholder stated that the board had
approved the transaction to go private).
118. Ben & Jerry's securities filings do not disclose acceptance of Hot Fudge Partner's offer.
119. Dan Gallagher, Dreyer's Loses Ben & Jerry's Bid to Unilever, EAST BAY BUSINESS TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2000.
120. See Unilever Completes Ben & Jerry's Homemade Tender Offer, UNILEVER (May 16,
2000), http://www.unilever.com/mediacentre/pressreleases/2000/jerry2.aspx.
121. Id
122. See, e.g., WERTHER & CHANDLER, supra note 93, at 140 (noting that "Ben & Jerry's cult
status was tarnished somewhat .. . when they sold out to the corporate giant Unilever"). Business Ethics
removed the company from its list of Best Corporate Citizens. Id
123. Press Release, Ben & Jerry Homemade, Inc., Ben & Jerry's & Unilever to Join Forces, (Apr.
12, 2000), available at http//www.benjerry.com/company/media-center/press/join-forces.html (quoting the
President of Unilever's North American division). See also David Gram, Ben & Jerry's Caves Into
Pressure, Sells To Unilever; English Company Buys Ice Cream Maker For $ 326 Million, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 2000, at Cl (quoting Richard Goldstein, President of Unilever Foods North America);
Jack Neff, It's Not Easy Being P.C.: Funding Anti-Globalization Protesters is One Price Unilever Pays For
Ben & Jerry's, FOOD PROCESSING, Feb. 1, 2002, at 18 (quoting Walt Freese, Unilever's first appointee as
chief marketing officer, stating that he found that Unilever really was committed to maintaining the
company's social mission, unlike other companies where he had worked).
124. Ben & Jery's Sale Opposed, CBS MARKETWATCH (Jan. 17,2000), http//www.marketwatch.
com/story/ben-jerrys-sale-opposed.
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were skeptical that Ben & Jerry's would remain a corporate force for
good,12 5 and some led an effort "to educate Unilever about the importance
of keeping the Ben & Jerry's social mission alive and creative," which
included a boycott and an email campaign.12 6
Unilever's acquisition of Ben & Jerry's included several unusual
provisions, touted by some as "unique and ground-breaking." 2 7 Unilever
chose to keep much of Ben & Jerry's operations separate.128 More
importantly, they committed to creating a board of directors composed
primarily of the existing board's nominees.129 This board was intended to
help manage the brand and provide leadership for the social mission.' 30
Initial members included Cohen, Greenfield, and Terry Mollner (described
as "a pillar of socially responsible investing").' 3 ' The board had the right to
sue Unilever if Unilever failed to meet the terms of the merger agreement
and to require Unilever to cover the litigation expenses.13 2 Yves Couette,
125. A Reputation is Tough to Maintain; Survey Results for Socially Responsible Companies,
WORK & FAMILY NEWSBRIEF, Mar. 1, 2001. See also 'Caring Capitalism: Not For Sale;'Bay Area Ben
& Jerry's Franchisees and Their Customers Join National Effort to Prevent Sale of the Company,
BUSINESS WIRE, Jan. 20, 2000; Michelle Holcenberg, Multiflavor, not Multinational: Protesting the
Corporate Takeover of Ben & Jerry's, ALTERNET (April 26, 2000), http://www.altemet.org/story/505/;
Walter Shapiro, Ice Cream Sellout and Street Protests, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2000 (predicting that Ben
& Jerry's "is now destined to become just another globe-girdling commodity, no more authentic in its
corporate parentage than its Bronx born competitor with a phony Scandinavian name, Hiiagen-Dazs").
126. SAvE BEN & JERRY'S, http://web.archive.org/web/20010116184500/http://savebenjerry.com/
(last visited Sept. 05, 2010).
127. Ben & Jerry's and Unilever to Join Forces in Ice Cream Deal that Maintains Social
Efforts, FOOD & DRINK WEEKLY, No. 15, Apr.17, 2000, at 1.
128. Patrick J. Kiger, Corporate Crunch, WORKFORCE MGMT, Apr. 1, 2005, at 32.
129. Solicitation Recommendation Statement, supra note 71.
130. Id. at 5-6 ("[T]he Surviving Corporation Board shall have primary responsibility with
respect to the enhancement of the Social Mission Priorities ... of the Company, as they may evolve, and
the preservation of the essential integrity of the Ben & Jerry's brand-name."). Unilever, however, would
"have primary responsibility in the area of financial and operational aspects of [Ben & Jerry's] and in all
areas not allocated" to the board. Id. at 6.
Established in perpetuity, the external board would conduct business in much the
same way as a company's board of directors-meeting at regularly appointed
times throughout the year and helping shape company policy with respect to
managing the brand. It formulated a corporate values statement to serve as
principles for managing the brand. This external board has a legal contract that
lives in perpetuity and the board can take legal action if the company's board of
directors does not uphold the contract. Unlike a more conventional board,
however, it does not report to any group outside of itself, such as shareholders or
other Unilever management, and new members are appointed by the board itself
(characteristics shared, intriguingly, by most nonprofit boards).
Austin & Leonard, supra note 21, at 94.
131. Constance L. Hays, Long Shots, on the Court and Off N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at 2,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/02/business/private-sector-long-shots-on-the-court-and-
off.html?scp-238&sq-/o22ben+%26+Jerry/o27s%22&st-nyt [hereinafter Hays, Long Shots].
132. This kind of provision is necessary to enforce the terms of the merger agreement, as
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the first CEO of Ben & Jerry's appointed by Unilever, believed that this
external board was "an amazing statement of humility and cooperation" that
helped show that Unilever was buying "the integrity of the brand."l 3 3
Unilever also agreed to continue to pay the greater of $1.1 million or
7.5% of pretax profits to charity, maintain in Vermont its "corporate
presence and substantial operations" for "at least five years,"'3 4 maintain the
existing method of production and not lay-off a material number of workers
for at least two years.'13 In addition, Unilever promised to contribute $5
million to assist minority-owned and undercapitalized businesses, $5
million to employees to be paid within six months, and $5 million to the
Ben & Jerry's Foundation.136 Cohen also agreed to work with Unilever on
"social audits," such as its treatment of the environment.13 7 Unilever's co-
chairman claimed his company "discovered early in its negotiations that it
and Ben & Jerry's had a similar vision, 1 38
The transaction dramatically increased the value of Ben & Jerry's
shares, including those owned by the founders. Cohen's shares at the time
of the sale were worth nearly $40 million and Greenfield's were worth
nearly $10 million.139 Additionally, both men remained on the company's
board for $200,000 each per year.14 0
Notwithstanding these favorable provisions, Ben & Jerry's board was
reportedly reluctant to sell.141 As Jim Barrett, a stock analyst, put it at the
time, "Ben & Jerry's had a legal responsibility to consider the takeover bids
- when offers are made well above a company's stock price, executives and
directors must examine them or risk a lawsuit. That responsibility is what
forced a sale."l42 Another person with knowledge of the bidding observed,
following the consummation of the merger, other parties either lack standing (the shareholders) or have
ceased to exist (the target company).
133. Austin & Leonard, supra note 21, at 94.
134. Solicitation Recommendation Statement, supra note 71, at 6.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 4.
137. Hays, Long Shots, supra note 131, at 32.
138. Hays, supra note 18, at Cl.
139. David Gram, Ben & Jerry's Founder Feeling Out in Cold; Questions Social Activism Since
Buyout, REcoRD (Bergen County, N.J.), Dec. 1, 2000, at B3.
140. Solicitation Recommendation Statement, supra note 71, at B-10.
141. Buyout Sweet Enough, supra note 104.
142. Id. (reporting that "distribution concerns and a series of takeover bids forced the pair finally
to accept the unthinkable, selling their company"). See also Entine, supra note 6, at 3 ("But in 2000,
when Unilever offered three times its floundering stock price, Ben & Jerry's founders... had little
choice but to heed their fiduciary duty to their shareholders and sell."); Holcenberg, supra note 125
("[S]ince Ben & Jerry's is in fact a public company, it's in a tricky situation. Its legal responsibility is
not to make a delicious dessert, protect the planet or improve the world, but to make its shareholders the
most moolah."); Lawrence, supra note 11.
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"The board felt they had no choice but to let all three groups put their best
offers on the table.. . . We think it's horrible that a company has no choice
but to sell to the highest bidder or get sued."l 43 Indeed, three class action
lawsuits alleging that the directors were breaching their fiduciary duties to
shareholders by failing to maximize shareholder value were filed while the
deal was being negotiated.'" Greenfield later stated:
We did not want to sell the business; it was a very difficult time.
But we were a public company, and the board of directors'
primary responsibility is the interest of the shareholders. So that
is what the decision came down to. It was extremely difficult,
heart-wrenching. It was a horrible experience for me and I can
probably say it was horrible for Ben too.. .. It is not as if we sold
it feeling great about the situation and ended up regretting it - we
didn't feel great about it from the start and throughout. It was
nothing about Unilever; we didn't want to get bought by
anybody.145
Cohen made the same claim: corporate law "required the board of
directors of Ben & Jerry's to take an offer, to sell the company despite the
fact that they did not want to sell the company." 46 The relationship with
Unilever, Cohen says, was a "forced marriage." 47
143. Hays, supra note 18 (quoting Terri Mollner, a principal of Meadowbrook). See also
Holcenberg, supra note 125 ("The directors of the company could actually be sued if they decide to put
the interests of their employees, family farmers and local communities above the interests of Wall
Street."); Dembosky, supra note 3 ("Lawyers told the board members that shareholders could sue if they
turned Unilever's offer down.").
144. Solicitation Recommendation Statement, supra note 71, at 12. Vincent F. Garrity, Jr. &
Mark A. Morton, Would the CSX. Conrail Express have Derailed in Delaware? A Comparative Analysis
ofLock-Up Provisions Under Delaware and Pennsylvania Law, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 677, 686 (1997)
(discussing shareholder litigation which found that solely maximizing shareholder value was "myopic").
Of course other shareholders and consumers fought against the takeover, such as Save Ben & Jerry's
with the slogan "Multi-flavors NOT multinationals." ARCHIVE, http://archive.org (follow "Take Me
Back" hyperlink; then search http://www.savebenjerry.com"; then select "Mar. 3, 2000" hyperlink)
("This site provides you the opportunity to get your message out to the Ben & Jerry's shareholders and
help them to find a truth higher than profit taking.") (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). A group also listed Ben
& Jerry's on eBay. See Controlling Ownership of Ben & Jerry's, INTERNET ARCHIVE,
http://web.archive.org/web/20010116192500/savebenjerry.com/e-bay listing.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2010) ("[H]urry, Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield can't hold out much longer or they might get sued by
their shareholders for trying to protect the environment and the community with their company instead
of making a quick buck.").
145. Hannah Pool, Question Time with Hannah Pool, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 31, 2008, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jul/31/5.
146. Dembosky, supra note 3 (quoting Cohen). See also Dave Gram, Ben and Jerry Back Bill to
Let Firms Pursue Social Mission, ASSOCIATED PRESS, April 12, 2010; Courtney Rubin, Ben & Jerry's
Fair Trade Fanfare Belies Struggle With Corporate Parent, INC., Feb. 22, 2010, available at
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II. CORPORATE LAW'S ROLE IN THE SALE OF BEN & JERRY'S: THE
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND THE REALITY
A. Corporate Law as Scapegoat
Ben & Jerry's is a leading example1 48 of an alleged problem with the
publicly traded corporate form. As discussed above, Cohen and Greenfield
claimed that they did not really want to sell Ben & Jerry's to a multinational
corporation, but that they were compelled to do so by the dictates of
corporate law-in other words, "corporate law made them do it."1 4 9 A
number of commentators also endorse this view. As Jill Bamburgh puts it,
"[i]n the case of Ben & Jerry's, the founders were forced out by a decision
of the public shareholders to sell to Unilever." 50  Somewhat more
accurately, commentators charged that corporate law and the fiduciary
duties of directors required its sale to the highest bidder.'5 '
Progressives assert that mainstream corporate law, at least with respect
to publicly held corporations, 152 almost inevitably erodes a corporation's
social mission, or inexorably thwarts the ability of well-intentioned
corporations to advance social goals in the long run."s' Their claim is that a
http://www.inc.com/news/articIes/2010/02/ben-and-jerrys-goes-fully-fairtrade.html (stating that "Cohen
and Greenfield said ... they couldn't stop Unilever from buying the company because its shares were
already publicly traded").
147. David Teather, Sold Up but Not Sold Out, Ben and Jerry Are Still the Poster Boys for Fair Trade,
TI OBSERVER, April 4, 2010, available at http/www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/04/ben-jerrys-
fairtrade-ethical-business.
148. See, e.g., Dembosky, supra note 3. However, Ben & Jerry's is one of many examples. See
Entine, supra note 6.
149. See supra pp. 16-21.
150. BAMBURGH, supra note 9, at 1. The Bamburgh statement is a gross oversimplification. Ben
& Jerry's shareholders only had a chance to vote on the merger because the board of directors had
already approved (and recommended) the transaction.
151. Robert R. Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations - For-profits, Nonprofits, and
Hybrids, 42 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 553, 579 at n.120 ("When the founders attempted to maintain control
in order to continue some of the corporation's charitable undertakings, they were subject to shareholder
suits and ultimately had to allow the corporation to be acquired by Unilever."). See also Hannah Clark,
A New Kind of Company: B Corporations Worry About Stakeholders, Not Just Shareholders, INC.
MAGAZINE, July 2007, at 23 (stating that corporate law requires publicly-traded companies, including
Ben & Jerry's, to maximize shareholder returns by selling out to the highest bidder); Dembosky, supra
note 3 (observing that shareholders can sue a board of directors if they think the board is "sacrificing
profits for some other non-profit-making reason").
152. Closely held corporations do not pose the same risks as publicly held corporations, as there
are far fewer shareholders who might object to the pursuit of a social mission. As a practical matter,
shareholders typically manage the business. Separation of ownership and control is much less likely
because the owners and managers of the enterprise are likely to be same.
153. See, e.g., Maijorie Kelly, The Legacy Problem: Why Social Mission Gets Squeezed out of
Freezing Out Ben & Jerry
corporation must be run to maximize shareholder wealth, without regard for
other stakeholders except to the degree that such regard will in fact
financially benefit shareholders.15 4 Put differently, the "special attributes"
of businesses that pursue both financial and social missions are "likely to be
fragile and easy to disrupt or destroy" with a publicly-owned business.'s
Did corporate law in fact require Ben & Jerry's board of directors to
sell the company to Unilever?' 56 The answer is almost certainly not, but to
understand why requires a basic understanding of how publicly-traded
companies are acquired and an in-depth look at Ben & Jerry's corporate
structure. As a preliminary matter, there are two principle ways to buy a
publicly-traded company. The first is a tender offer, which is merely an
offer to purchase shares from the existing holders. If the acquirer obtains
shares holding more than 50% of the voting rights, the acquirer will be able
to elect its own board of directors and exercise control. The second, the Ben
& Jerry's transaction, is a merger. Both the board of directors and the
shareholders must approve a merger.'5 7 The issue then is whether in the first
instance a board must allow a tender offer to reach the shareholders and in
the second instance whether a board must approve a merger. Corporate law
is very flexible and permits many actions that can prevent a sale of the
company under either method without the existing board's approval.
B. Shareholder Wealth Maximization: Rhetoric and Practice
The claim that a board must maximize shareholder value has a
legitimate source. In the 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the court
famously explained that the directors' powers must be employed "primarily
Firms When They're Sold, and What to Do About It, BUSINESS ETHICs (2003), available at
http://www.esopbuilders.com/articles/the-legacy-problem.pdf (arguing that going public results in a loss
of mission). This criticism, and problems with the nonprofit form, have led to new forms and calls for
new forms. The law may create an exceedingly "rigid line-dividing for-profit vs. nonprofit," thereby
causing problems for the hybrid organization. Susan H. Mac Cormac, The Emergence ofNew Corporate
Forms: The Need for Alternative Corporate Designs Integrating Financial and Social Missions,
http://www.corporation202O.org/pdfs/SummitPaperSeries.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
154. Keatinge, supra note 151, at 578-79 ("[There are circumstances in which a business
organization wishes to do good while doing well, viz, to operate in the area between the purely pecuniary
and the entirely eleemosynary. . . . To the extent the managers of such an organization [organized as a for-
profit] wish to conduct a business in a way as to promote a non-economic objective, they may find
themselves confronted with demands from the owners that profit be maximized.").
155. Austin & Leonard, supra note 21, at 79.
156. Ben & Jerry's also had distribution issues regarding its ice cream--notably its distributors
were two big competitors, Dreyer's and Haagen-Dazs. Hays,Going Private, supra note 117.
157. Corporate law provides that shareholders have a vote, inter alia, on mergers or substantial
corporate changes, like the sale of most assets, See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit I IA, § 11.01 (1997) (stating
that shareholders may be required to approve the merger plan).
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for the profit of the stockholders" and that directors may not change that
goal or "devote [profits] to other purposes." 58
The rhetoric of shareholder wealth maximization, however, has
produced almost no legal results.'59 Although it is fair to claim that there is
a norm, and possibly even a legal requirement, of shareholder wealth
maximization (i.e. that directors must make decisions in order to maximize
corporate profitability),160  commentators on both the right and left
recognize that shareholder wealth maximization is effectively
unenforceable by courts.161 Under the business judgment rule, courts will
almost invariably defer to the directors' judgment.16 2 As long as a course of
action may lead to some potential benefit to shareholders, even in the far
distant future, the directors' decisions will survive judicial review.163 Ben &
Jerry's could thus always claim that its social activities helped it achieve its
financial goals.'6" A decision to enter or not enter into a merger agreement,
for example, without more, would be judged under this standard 6 1
Occasionally, however, there may be more. An important exception to
the unenforceability of shareholder wealth maximization may apply in the
context of the sale of the company:' 6 6 Revlon duties. A board may have
158. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
159. Other courts have acknowledged additional goals. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v.
Barlow, 98 S.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953) (observing that "modem conditions require that corporations
acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the communities
within which they operate").
160. See, e.g., Antony Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107
MICH. L. REv. 979,987-93 (2009) (evaluating arguments regarding shareholder wealth maximization).
161. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAw 313 (2000) ("[A] rule
which requires directors to act purely as profit maximizers is unenforceable."). Product markets are also
thought to constrain mission-oriented operational decisions. Companies that do not produce a
competitive product go out of business. Ben & Jerry's, however, was either operating to maximize
profitability as they claimed, or alternatively had identified a niche where consumers were willing to
subsidize the social mission. See supra note 70.
162. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REv. 83, 87 (2004) (concluding that the business judgment rule is properly understood as a
doctrine of judicial abstention, focusing on boards' decision-making process rather than the substantive
outcome).
163. Id.
164. See supra note 70.
165. See, e.g., Cede v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993) (stating that director
self-interest must be shown on both sides of the transaction to rebut the presumption that the directors'
judgment is valid); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (stating that under the
business judgment rule, there "'is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company.') (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
166. Companies that would otherwise choose to make decisions that do not maximize shareholder
wealth may face constraints from the market for corporate control, i.e. they may be bought by others. See,
e.g., Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the "Responsible" Shareholder, 10 STANFORD J.
LAW. Bus. & FINANCE 31, 36-37 (stating that the market is "a mechanism which ensures that
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"Revlon duties," an obligation to maximize shareholders' immediate return,
when the company's break-up is inevitable or its shareholders are getting
cashed-out or selling control.167 Despite acknowledging that "concern for
various corporate constituencies is proper," the Revlon court noted that any
concern for non-shareholders must have some "rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders."6 s In a situation where the shareholders will
have no further economic stake in the enterprise, such as a cash-out merger,
concern for other constituencies could not be rationally related to a
shareholder benefit. People who believed that corporate law required the
sale likely relied on Revlon duties, but as discussed in detail in Section III-
D, Revlon duties need not have applied and, even if they did, may not have
required the sale.
C Ben & Jerry's Defenses
If a company's board refuses to negotiate a sale, the party seeking to
acquire it may make a tender offer directly to shareholders. If the offer is
sufficiently generous, enough shareholders may sell to the acquirer to give
it control.'69 Target boards are, however, permitted under corporate law to
take actions-defensive measures-that reduce the likelihood of a tender
offer's success.o70 Whether these actions are good or bad for shareholders
from a financial perspective is hotly debated,' 7' but their legality is
unquestioned.172
Ben & Jerry's, perhaps because it had been put up for sale early in its
existence, 73 was fully aware of the potential risk of a take-over. 74 To
management's conduct is at least somewhat responsive to shareholders' wishes"). As explained below,
however, controlling shareholders cannot be compelled to sell even when faced with a wealth maximizing
option. See discussion, infra Part II.
167. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
See also Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) (stating that one
justification for imposing Revlon duties is to limit managers from self-interested transactions).
168. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176, 182.
169. As explained in Part III-E, it is unlikely that this would have worked against Ben & Jerry's.
170. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (allowing corporate
defenses); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (same).
171. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and
Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US. and UK. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO L. J. 1729, 1741 (2007).
172. Id.
173. See COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 22-23 (explaining that Cohen and Greenfield
decided to put Ben & Jerry's up for sale in 1982).
174. As Ben & Jerry's last annual report as an independent company stated, "Ben & Jerry's has,
through the years, taken actions intended to strengthen the Company's ability to remain an independent
Vermont-based company focused on carrying out its three-part corporate mission." Annual Report 2000,
supra note 28, at 2.
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prevent a forced sale, the company had implemented several defensive
measures.s7 5 In August 1998, Ben & Jerry's introduced a shareholder-rights
plan, also known as a "poison pill."'76 In simple terms, a poison pill would
make any hostile takeover staggeringly more expensive by diluting the
acquirer's holdings. 77 A poison pill, however, can be redeemed if a
majority of the directors so vote in order to permit friendly acquisitions.178
One possibility for an acquirer faced with a board that refuses to
redeem its pill is to launch a proxy contest, with the goal of electing
directors more favorable to the acquisition, who might then redeem the
pill."'9 In 1997, however, Ben & Jerry's had also introduced a staggered
board, meaning that only a third of the board would be elected each year. 180
An acquirer would have to win elections in two successive years rather than
just one in order to gain control. As explained in Part III-E, given the
founders' super-voting stock, a successful proxy contest would be
extremely unlikely. As a 2002 empirical study showed, "staggered boards
make it extremely difficult for a hostile bidder to gain control over the
incumbents' objections,"' 8 ' even without super-voting stock.
A second possibility for an acquirer is to go to court asserting that the
board's fiduciary duties to the shareholders require that the pill be
redeemed. Would corporate law compel the board of directors to redeem the
poison pill, thereby allowing an offer to go forward, even if directors
personally did not want to sell? A decision not to redeem a pill would, as a
defensive measure, typically be judged under a stricter standard than the
business judgment rule: enhanced scrutiny, also known as the Unocal
standard of review. 8 2 Under Unocal review, a court determines whether a
175. Corporate defenses can also be thought of as "mission maintenance mechanisms." These
mechanisms can blunt the impact of the market and restrict the ability of an acquiring company to
eliminate the constraints on the ability of the managers to pursue profits over non-pecuniary goals. See,
e.g., Lee, supra note 166, at 37.
176. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Form 8-Al2B (Class A) (Aug. 13, 1998),
http://www.secinfo.com/dsVsd.7lB7.htm; Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Form 8-A12G (Class B)
(Aug. 13, 1998), http://www.secinfo.com/dsVsd.7lb6.htm.
177. See generally, Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887 (2002) (discussing the implementation and
varying effectiveness of a poison pill in corporate takeovers).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 899.
180. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., 1998 10-K Ex.-3.(1), Articles of Amendment (Mar. 27,
1998). The amendment also provided for a two-thirds shareholder majority vote in order to repeal the
amendment. Id.
181. Bebchuk, supra note 177, at 890.
182. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). See also Moran v. Household
Intern., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985) (stating that a board's decision not to redeem a pill would
be judged under Unocal).
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defensive measure (failing to redeem a pill) is reasonable in relation to the
threat posed (almost any change in company policy).183 In practice there are
very few cases where courts have overturned a board's decision.1 4 Courts
typically determine reasonableness by deciding if a board's actions are
preclusive or coercive,185 and Ben & Jerry's pill was neither.186
D. Avoiding Revlon Duties
Courts have enforced Revlon duties, under which the board is required
to take actions reasonably likely to maximize shareholder value.187 Revlon
duties, however, are quite limited, as directors can usually avoid them.18
Revlon duties attach, or are triggered, when ,
[A] corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell
itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear
break-up of the company. However, Revlon duties may also be
triggered where, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons
its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction
involving the breakup of the company.189
This permits directors to just say no. Even where the company actually is
for sale, as long as the consideration for shareholders includes stock in the
183. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
184. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 772 (2006) (noting academics and others describing Unocal as "a failure," a
"toothless standard," "fairly inconsequential, " "a toothless tiger," as giving directors "a fairly forgiving,
if not entirely free, pass," and "a dead letter") (citations omitted).
185. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995). The court explained,
"[tihe ratio decidendi for the 'range of reasonableness' standard is a need of the board of directors for
latitude in discharging its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders when defending against
perceived threats. The concomitant requirement is for judicial restraint. Consequently, if the board of
directors' defensive response is not draconian (preclusive or coercive) and is within a 'range of
reasonableness,' a court must not substitute its judgment for the board's." Id.
186. Vermont's other constituency statute, discussed infra at notes 193-96 and accompanying
text, might also have permitted Ben & Jerry's board to retain its pill.
187. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillian Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del. 1989).
188. See, e.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. Jul. 24,
1989, revised Mar. 9,1990); Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del.
1994) (stating that a stock-for-stock merger does not implicate Revlon duties if control "remain[s] in a
large, fluid, changeable and changing market") (quoting Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc., No.
10866, 1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 94, 514 (Del. Ch. Jul. 14, 1989)). Even a de facto change of
control may not trigger Revlon duties in the event that there are sufficient protections for the minority
shareholders. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1338 (Del. 1987)
(refusing to apply Revlon duties where a standstill agreement capped the shareholder's holdings at
49.9% and limited its board representation to 40%).
189. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d at 47 (quoting Time, 571 A.2d at 1150) (emphasis removed).
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new enterprise (and will not result in a controlling shareholder), the
directors may consider non-shareholder constituencies.190 For example,
negotiating a no-termination clause for employees could have a rational
benefit for shareholders as a result of increased employee loyalty and effort
for the new enterprise.
Although Ben & Jerry's was considering offers, none of the Revlon
triggers applied. Neither the break-up nor the sale of the company was
inevitable. 9 ' Even if the board had Revlon duties, many states had passed
other constituency statutes which gutted Revlon by either allowing or
requiring directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders,
regardless of the benefit to shareholders.19 2 Vermont was no exception. In
1998, the Vermont legislature had passed just such an other-constituency
statute.'93 This statute expressly allows a board to consider social issues,
such as the interests of employees and suppliers, when evaluating
acquisition offers, rather than only focusing on shareholder wealth
maximization.' 94 It was in fact nicknamed "the Ben & Jerry's law," because
the company-showing great foresight-pushed for the law after rebuffing
the 1998 offer from Dreyer's. 195
Notwithstanding the plain language of the law, the board may have
been afraid to accept a lower offer (that of socially-oriented Hot Fudge
Partners) because the Vermont law was untested in the courts-the board
190. Time, 571 A.2dat 1153.
191. Even if Ben & Jerry's had accepted the Hot Fudge Partners' offer, it is still unlikely that
Revlon duties would attach, as it is not clear that the public shareholders were selling control. See
Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994) (holding that Revlon duties were not triggered when a
board approved a merger with its controlling shareholders because there was no sale of corporate
control). This is merely to say that the board could still turn down a higher second offer, not that it
would be able to accept the lower controller's offer.
192. See, e.g., Garrity & Morton, supra note 144, at 697 (noting that a board may satisfy its
fiduciary duty to shareholders even as it accepts a lower offer that provides more protection to workers).
Perhaps not surprisingly, many commentators have charged that these statutes have merely served to
protect incumbent boards and managers. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes
and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1228, 1228 (2004).
193. VT. STAT. ANN. tit II A, § 8.30 (2009).
194. Id § 8.30(a)(3) (stating that the director may "consider the interests of the corporation's
employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of the state, region and nation, community and
societal considerations . .. and any other factors the director in his or her discretion reasonably considers
appropriate in determining what he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation... and including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation"). In an interesting omission, the board of directors, in approving the sale
of Ben & Jerry's, determined only that the sale was in the best interest of the shareholders. Solicitation
Recommendation Statement, supra note 71. By contrast, in their annual report, the company claimed that its
defenses were not only in the best interests of the company, but also "its stockholders, employees, suppliers,
customers and the Vermont community." Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at 2.
195. Who's Buying Ben & Jerry's?, ICE CREAM REP., Dec. 20, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR
8325403.
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believed that a lawsuit might follow and go all the way to the Vermont
Supreme Court where they might eventually lose.'96  The issue was
apparently the magnitude of the social discount. The board felt that if bids
were close, they could accept the lower bid, but the difference between $38
per share and $43.60 was too high.197 If the law needed a case to test its
limits; Ben & Jerry's declined to be that case.
E. Ben & Jerry's Capital Structure
Even if a court would require the poison pill to be redeemed to allow a
tender offer to go forward, or the board's Revlon duties were such that-
given the value presented by Unilever's offer-Vermont's other
constituency statute would not protect the board, it is still unlikely that
corporate law would require a sale. Corporate law permits parties to
preserve control regardless of their equity positions. As one Delaware case
stated:
Our corporation law provides great flexibility to shareholders in
creating the capital structure of their firm. Differing classes of
stock with differing voting rights are permissible under our law;
restriction on transfers are possible, and charter provisions
requiring the filling of certain directorates by a class of stock are,
if otherwise properly adopted, valid. 9 8
Ben & Jerry's had established an intricate capital structure comprised of
both Class A and Class B common stock.1 99 Class A stock was publicly
traded and had one vote per share.200 Class B stock was not publicly traded
196. Jim Steiker & Michael Golden, Hot Fudge Partners: Insiders Tell How Social Investors
Tried to (but Couldn't) Buy Ben & Jerry's, BUSINESS ETHics, May-June 2000, at 7. See also KELLY,
supra note 15, at 147 (2001) ("[T]he board might have been protected in selling to them [Cohen and a
group of social investors] at a lower price had it used Vermont's stakeholder statute. But [they] feared
lawsuits and declined to test that law.").
197. Kelly, supra note 153, at 5 (stating that lawyers advised Hot Fudge Partners that they
would lose if the law were litigated). See also id. (quoting investor Terry Mollner, who stated that "the
legal tradition remains that 'shareholders are entitled to an unlimited upside"--meaning that Unilever's
bid would ultimately prevail). While Mollner is correct regarding the legal tradition, he perhaps
underestimates the discretion given to directors, even in takeover contexts. See, e.g., Paramount
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149-51 (Del. Jul. 24, 1989, revised Mar. 9, 1990)
(stating that Time was allowed to restructure their own transaction with Warner, thereby depriving
shareholders of a vote on the transaction, and more importantly, depriving shareholders of the
opportunity to accept a very generous offer from Paramount).
198. Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 275 (Del. Ch. 1986) (citations omitted).
199. See generally, Annual Report 2000, supra note 28.
200. Id. at 11.
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but had ten votes per share.20 1 Class B stock was nontransferable, unless it
was first converted into Class A stock.202 By 2000, founders Cohen,
Greenfield, and Jeff Furman (a director of both Ben & Jerry's and the Ben
& Jerry's Foundation) had 47% of the votes for board elections, which as a
practical matter meant they elected the board members and could thus
control Ben & Jerry's policies.203 It also meant that a tender offer without
the support of Cohen, Greenfield, and Furman could not succeed in
obtaining control, and a merger would be unlikely to be approved.20
In addition, Ben & Jerry's had issued preferred stock that held special
voting rights with regard to various business combinations, including most
mergers and tender offers.205 The Ben & Jerry's Foundation was the sole
holder of this preferred stock, which meant that a takeover of Ben & Jerry's
would require the Foundation's agreement .2  Two of the three members of
the Ben & Jerry's Foundation board were none other than Cohen and Jeff
Furman. 207 Not only that, but the Foundation itself was takeover-proof, as it
208
was a nonprofit organization whose board selected its own successors.
This structure, reportedly invented by Cohen and Greenfield,209 was
described as "one of the most clever anti-takeover devices ever: a charitable
foundation that doubles as a corporate 'shark repellant."' 210 Again, a tender
offer or merger would fail without the support of the Foundation.
It does not suffice to say that Cohen, Greenfield, Furman, or the
Foundation would have fiduciary obligation to vote their shares in favor of
a merger or tender their shares in an offer. Although persons have fiduciary
duties to the shareholders, perhaps even Revlon duties, when acting as
directors, persons acting as shareholders have few obligations to other
shareholders. Parties acting as shareholders of public corporations, unlike
201. Id.
202. Id. at 12.
203. Id. at 22. See also Who's Buying Ben & Jerry's?, supra note 195 (stating that the co-
founders and Furman owned enough stock to prevent the takeover). At the time that the corporation was
sold to Unilever, Cohen and Greenfield owned respectively 6.7% and 2.1% of the Class A stock and
61.5% and 11.3% of the Class B stock. Annual Report 2000, supra note 28. Jeff Furman, a director of
both Ben & Jerry's and the Foundation, owned a further 3.8% of the Class B stock. Id.
204. In order to prevail in a merger vote, the acquirer would need the support of more than 94%
of the unaffiliated shares. Voter turnout alone could make that difficult.
205. Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at I1.
206. Michael J. Schill, Ben & Jerry's Homemade (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (SSRN
Electronic Library), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=909725.
207. Id. at 12.
208. Sloan, supra note 69. See also Robert Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise,
35 VT. L. REV. 59 (2010) (discussing how a nonprofit organization is immune to takeovers).
209. Sloan, supra note 69.
210. Id. at 80. Greenfield argued that giving the Foundation a veto power was "only fair,"
because in the event of a takeover the Foundation would lose its 7.5% of the company's profit. Id.
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when they act as directors, 2 1 ' are permitted to enjoy the benefits of selfish
ownership of those shares, which includes choosing whether or not to
accept a superior offer. Thus, even if Greenfield, Cohen, and Furman had a
fiduciary obligation to vote in favor of the Unilever merger as directors, this
212did not mean they had to vote in favor of the transaction as shareholders,
or that the Foundation had to vote in favor as a shareholder.2 13 Greenfield,
Cohen, and Furman (and the Foundation)-acting as shareholders-could
exercise selfish ownership, in the sense that even though they might be
willing to participate in a sale of the company to themselves for $38 they
could also be unwilling to sell to a third party for a greater amount.2 14
If we assume that a company's board knows that the controlling
shareholders will not support a transaction-a majority shareholder of
whose votes are required before a corporation can merge-corporate law
would not require the board to agree to such a transaction, even when the
transaction offered superior value to shareholders than could be achieved
independently.215 After all, what would be the point of accepting a merger
offer that would inevitably be defeated by shareholders?
There is one complication to the above analysis. The company states
that the corporate charter allowed the company's board to redeem the
preferred stock on a "specified vote" and convert the Class B common
stock.216 It is difficult to understand why a company would both create a
capital structure granting certain securities voting preferences and vest
power in the board to eliminate those preferences. It is also uncertain how a
211. See Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 276 (stating that the defendant's
threat to use his power as director "to block transactions that may be in the best interests of the Company"
was different from simply using his "power qua shareholder"). Acting as a director, the defendant was
bound by his fiduciary duties to other shareholders. Id. In contrast, in Delaware the shareholder acting as
shareholder generally does not owe fiduciary duties (or "special, judicially-created rules") to protect other
shareholders. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993). Hewlett Packard's high profile
takeover of Compaq serves as another example. Walter B. Hewlett voted in favor of the transaction as a
director of Hewlett Packard, but launched a proxy contest against the transaction as a shareholder. Steve
Lohr, Hewlett Heir Issues Letter Denouncing Planned Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14,2001, at C4.
212. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 45 (3d Cir. 1947) ("We must also re-
emphasize ... that there is a radical difference when a stockholder is voting strictly as a stockholder and
when voting as a director .... ) (citations omitted).
213. Cohen and Fuhrman would have fiduciary duties to the Foundation when acting as
directors of the Foundation. There is, however, no duty to maximize profits when acting as the director
of a foundation.
214. Of course other shareholders also had the right to vote against the merger if they preferred
an independent Ben & Jerry's. Although nobody compelled the other shareholders to support a merger,
presumably cash and a merger was preferable to independence.
215. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. IlA, § I1.01(a), ll.03(b)(1)(2009) (requiring both the board and
shareholders to approve a merger independently).
216. Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at 58 (stating that the corporate charter allowed
company directors to eliminate special voting rights).
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court would treat a board's decision to either eliminate-or fail to
eliminate-those preferences. The board would, after all, have full fiduciary
duties to all common stock holders, and not just the Class A stockholders. 2 17
If the redemption and conversion were required, it would conflict with the
company's public disclosure acknowledging that its capital structure would
make it "difficult for a third party to acquire control" if the transaction were
not supported by the three principal Class B stockholders or the
Foundation.2 18 In truth, the transaction would need only be supported by
Ben & Jerry's board.
In short, if it is assumed that: (1) the board unintentionally triggered
Revlon duties; (2) Vermont's other constituency statute would be
ineffective; and (3) that the board would have a fiduciary obligation to
eliminate the super-voting stock and preferred stock, then the board would
indeed be compelled to accept Unilever's offer if they thought it would
maximize shareholder value. If all of these assumptions hold, then it could
be said that after Revlon duties attached, corporate law required the sale,
albeit not before. Alternatively, if any of those assumptions failed (or if the
redemption and conversion provisions had not been included), corporate
law would not require the sale.
Even if the assumptions do hold true and the law did require the sale,
however, this result would not be the fault of corporate law failing to
protect a left-liberal corporate icon, but a simple failure of execution on the
part of the company, its founders, or perhaps its lawyers. Corporate law
permitted granting a takeover veto to a charitable foundation through
preferred stock and a disproportionate voting interest to long-term
shareholders like the founders. Corporate law did not require granting the
board discretion to eliminate the seemingly carefully crafted capital
structure defense. The redemption and conversion provisions (and the
board's error in triggering Revlon) would then have effectively gutted Ben
& Jerry's many-layered defenses.
So why did those in control of Ben & Jerry's choose to sell? Cohen and
Greenfield seem to have taken the necessary steps ex ante to give
themselves the freedom to reject Unilever's offer. Legal commentators have
suggested several motivations, including the company's litigation and
217. There are very few opinions which confront this situation. One case involving a company's
right to convert a class of common stock, Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 295 Ky. 226, 229-31
(1943), avoids the problem of conflicting fiduciary duties by recognizing that one class is in the nature
of junior preferred stock. In addition, in there was a plausible rationale for the inclusion of the
conversion mechanism as it had economic substance. Id. In contrast, voting rights are the only difference
between the two classes of Ben & Jerry's common stock. See Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at 10.
218. Id. at 59.
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management issues, 21 9 and that Cohen and Greenfield were ready to focus
exclusively on their charitable causes, 220  or were comfortable with
Unilever.22 1
The best explanation, however, may be, as Cohen himself has stated,
that the directors were afraid of the risk of personal liability. 2 22 Apparently
there was a "genuine fear" on the board that rejecting the offer could result
in board members' personal bankruptcy.223 If the foregoing analysis is
correct, any risk of personal liability would be very small, particularly for
the outside directors.2 24 Moreover, the risk would have been even smaller,
given that Ben & Jerry's had a provision in its Articles that indemnified
225board members for nearly all breaches of their fiduciary duties.
Who really lost Ben & Jerry's? It was not corporate law that inexorably
pushed the company to subordinate its social mission to the financial
bottom line. Rather, Ben & Jerry's board members preferred Unilever's
offer and no risk of personal liability to testing Ben & Jerry's defenses,
discovering whether the board was obliged to eliminate the supervoting
219. See Michele Simon, Can Food Companies Be Trusted to Self-Regulate?, 39 LOYOLA L.A.
L. REv. 169 (2006) (pointing to Ben and Jerry's litigation and management issues causing a desire to
offload the company). A key operational issue was due to the ice cream's distribution by two of its big
competitors, Dreyer's and Haagen-Dazs. See Hays, Going Private, supra note 117 (stating that Ben &
Jerry's "never solved some important issues, including how to get their product onto store shelves
reliably").
220. See, e.g., Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of
Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 94-95 (2004) (suggesting that Cohen and
Greenfield were simply ready to focus more exclusively on their charitable causes).
221. Cohen may also have felt comfortable with Unilever due to the fact that they participated in
some social causes such as funding hospitals and schools in developing countries. See Laura P. Hartman
et al., The Communication of Corporate Social Responsibility: United States and European Union
Multinational Corporations, 74 J. Bus. ETHICS 373, 379 (2007).
222. See, e.g., Dembosky, supra note 3.
223. According to a well-placed confidential source.
224. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2006)
qpding that "out-of-pocket payments by outside directors are rare").
Ben & Jerry's indemnification provision reads:
No director of the Corporation shall be personally liable to the corporation or its
stockholders for money damages for any action taken, solely as a director, based
on a failure to discharge his or her own duties in accordance with Section 8.30
(entitled "general standards for directors") of the Vermont Business Corporation
Act, except for: (i) the amount of financial benefit received by a director to which
the director is not entitled; (ii) an intentional or reckless infliction of harm on the
Corporation or the shareholders; (iii) a violation . . . [for unlawful distributions];
or (iv) an intentional or reckless criminal act. The foregoing additional provisions
shall not be construed in any way so as to impose or create any duty or liability.
Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Amendment to Articles of Association, June 24, 1995, Quarterly
Report, filed Aug. 7, 1995, available at http://www.secinfo.com/dNEcf.aa.8.htm.
Plaintiffs best argument would be to argue that failing to accept the offer and convert or redeem the
supervoting and preferred stock would be an "intentional infliction of harm" on the shareholders.
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stock and the preferred stock, and facing some non-zero risk of liability. 226
Perhaps they simply overestimated the risk of liability. In any event, Cohen
and Greenfield (and the other directors) voted in favor of the sale,
notwithstanding the transaction's potential threat to the company's mission.
As the next section discusses, however, the sale was not necessarily a bad
thing.
III. How MUCH SELL-OUT RESULTED FROM BEN & JERRY'S SALE?
In the conflict of "capitalism vs. tie-die" 227 which would prevail? Or as
a New York Times reporter asked, "Did Ben & Jerry's sell out, or is the
Ben & Jerry's culture invading the corporate world?" 28 The critics' most
dire predictions about Ben & Jerry's loss of social mission have not been
borne out, but there was good reason for concern.
When the merger was announced, the Ben & Jerry's company issued a
press release asserting (optimistically) that:
[S]hareholders will be rewarded for their investment; Ben &
Jerry's employees will be protected; the current social mission of
Ben & Jerry's will be encouraged and well-funded, which will
lead to improved performance in this area; and an opportunity has
been offered for Ben & Jerry's to contribute to Unilever's social
practices worldwide.229
Cohen's outlook was more tentative and nuanced. Several months
before the sale, he declared his "strong personal belief that the only way
that the company can actualize its progressive values is to remain
independent." 230 After the sale, he described Ben & Jerry's as a former
"smaller 'social values led' business[]" that was "in the process of
becoming ... an entity inside a larger business," and "trying to infuse those
226. It was also Ben & Jerry's board who, 15 years earlier, had left the loophole in the
company's otherwise impervious corporate defenses, by allowing the board to eliminate the supervoting
stock and the preferred stock.
227. Who's Buying Ben & Jerry's?, supra note 195 (asking "can Cohen and Greenfield,
recognized leaders in the movement to create capitalism with a human face, approve a sale that, while
great for the bottom line, might lead to the demise of the company's ground-breaking social agenda?")
(emphasis omitted).
228. Hays, supra note 18 (responding to the question with "[a] scoop of each, perhaps").
229. Press Release, Bmn & Jetny's Homemade, Inc, Bem & Jerry's & Unilever to Join Forces (Apr. 12,
2000 amilable at http/ww.benjerry .com/company/edia-c join-forces.htl [hereinafter Press Release].
230. Holcenberg, supra note 125 (quoting Cohen in an interview on New Hampshire Public
Radio).
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values in that larger business. We expect that it will be a long and winding
road."23 1
Ben & Jerry's, now a (self-described) "wholly-owned autonomous
subsidiary of Unilever,"232 has had mixed success in maintaining its values
and infusing these into its parent company.233 The conventional view is that
Ben & Jerry's is a textbook illustration of the "legacy problem": a socially-
conscious corporation's social mission being squeezed out when the
founders leave, sell, or go public.2 34 Jill Bamburgh believes that "the sale of
Ben & Jerry's failed to address" the key issue of ensuring that the social
mission of the company would survive the exit of the founders and early
investors.23 5
Marjorie Kelly examined the results of the sale. She argues:
In the three years since 4-11 [2000], Ben & Jerry's has seen its
social mission begin to seep away-Unilever has laid off one in
five B&J employees, stopped donating 7.5 percent of profits to
the Ben & Jerry's Foundation, and hired a CEO Cohen didn't
approve of. It's been a wakeup call in socially responsible
business circles, where preventing mission loss when a company
changes hands has become the problem of the hour.236
Kelly also claims that key provisions in the merger agreement are
unenforceable,2 37 and that some fundamental issues were never
231. Constance L. Hays, Ben & Jerry's Deal Takes on Slightly New Flavor, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2009, at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/02/business/the-markets-market-place-ben-
jerry-s-deal-takes-on-slightly-new-flavor.html (quoting Ben Cohen).
232. Pofile ofBen & Jeny 's, UNILEVER USA, http /unleverusa.com/bands/foodbrands/benandjenys/ (last
visited Sept. 2, 2010) (emphasis added).
233. We leave out here those who have criticized not Ben & Jerry's social mission, but their sale
of calorie-rich desserts. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, GET BACK IN THE Box: INNOVATION FROM
INSIDE OuT 250 (2005) (answering in the negative the question "Does encouraging charitable giving,
environmental responsibility, and fair labor standards compensate for the obesity encouraged by its
products and marketing campaigns?"). We are also leaving out critiques of quality of the product, such
as the company's use of high-fructose corn syrup, at least to the degree that these changes appear
unrelated to the company's social mission. See, e.g., Entine, supra note 6.
234. Kelly, supra note 153; see also Susan H. Mac Cormac, The Emergence of New Corporate
Forms: The Need for Alternative Corporate Designs Integrating Financial and Social Missions,
http://www.corporation202O.org/pdfs/SummitPaperSeries.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2000) ("Many
socially oriented for-profits find that their social mission is dependent on founders' fervor, and when
founders retire or sell, their social legacy is often lost as more traditional owners and managers take
over.").
235. BAMBURGH, supra note 9, at 73.
236. Kelly, supra note 153.
237. Id. (noting that the Ben & Jerry's merger agreement included provisions that effectively
cannot be verified, such as Unilever's commitment regarding the sourcing of dairy goods). Joe Sibilia of
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memorialized, such as Unilever's commitment to hire only CEOs for Ben &
Jerry's who Cohen personally approved.23 8
Kevin Jones, an investment manager who specializes in social
enterprises, agrees that key aspects of Ben & Jerry's social mission were
lost after the acquisition.2 39 Although some visible aspects survived, such as
the avoidance of dairy products made with bovine growth hormone,240 some
less visible ones have fallen by the wayside. One example is the nonprofit
partner ice cream shops.2 4 1 The company did not demand franchise fees
from these shops, which were partly staffed by "at-risk youth who learned
from social workers and job supervisors how to have a bank account and to
complete a high school equivalency exam."2 42 Another example: Unilever
has gone back on some of its promises such as an ice cream made from fair
trade ingredients. 243 Even Greenfield concluded in 2008 that he believed it
was fair to call him and Cohen "sell outs." 244
These criticisms may, however, be overstated. Other observers are far
more positive about the social value created by the transaction. For
example, James Austin and Herman Leonard, professors at Harvard
Business School, specifically praise the external board for serving as "a
warning buzzer. . .blocking or reversing operational decisions that might
have led away from Ben & Jerry's core values."245 More generally, they
claim that Ben & Jerry's, like some other businesses with a social mission,
managed to create sustainable "special know-how" or "social technology"
that "embeds social values into their missions, production processes,
product characteristics, organizational cultures, and relationships with their
employees, their suppliers, and their consumers,, 2 46 Some Ben & Jerry's
employees believe that Unilever is interested in this social technology.
Helen Jones states Unilever "has encouraged us to be a grain of sand in
[Unilever's] eye and I believe it wants to learn from us too.24 In making
Meadowbrook Lane Capital stated that, "[p]rovisions in the Unilever contract are legally binding, but we
have not been able to enforce them." Id.
238. Id.
239. Jones, supra note 2.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. Immediately before the takeover there were only eight such partnerships, as opposed to
164 conventional domestic franchises. Annual Report 2000, supra note 28, at I1.
243. Simon, supra note 219, at 234. Ben & Jerry's has now committed to use only Fair Trade
Certified ingredients, where such ingredients exist, by the end of 2013. See Ben & Jerry's Goes Globally
Nuts for Fair Trade, BUSINESS WIRE (Feb. 18, 2010, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20100217007206/en/Ben-Jerry/oE2%80%99s-Globally-Nuts-Fair-Trade.
244. Pool, supra note 145.
245. Austin & Leonard, supra note 21, at 94.
246. Id. at 79.
247. M&A Case Study - Ben & Jerry's: A Big Dollop of Investment, BRAND STRATEGY, Apr. 5,
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its acquisition, Unilever was in fact looking at the new market segment
created by Ben & Jerry's and "betting on products with high social content
becoming a salient component of the future marketplace" and thus was
always likely to keep the salient pro-social aspects of the company.24 8
Ben & Jerry's continues to be involved in progressive initiatives like
voter-registration drives (2004), protesting against drilling in the Arctic
(2005), speaking out against global warming (2006), expanding the use of
hyrdofluorocarbon-free equipment, 2 49  supporting same-sex marriage
(2009),250 and increasing the use of Fair Trade Certified ingredients
(201 0).251 The company has taken more steps to reduce its carbon footprint,
minimize waste, and improve its overall efficiency.252 It has continued to
produce its annual "Social & Environmental Assessment Reports." 253 The
company's marketing continues to advance its social mission.254 Jon Entine
goes even further, suggesting that but for Unilever, "Ben & Jerry's values
would be mostly symbolic, talked about in the past tense."255
Put differently, Unilever presumably feels market pressure to preserve
those qualities and activities that consumers support and are willing to
subsidize. Accordingly, Unilever has kept Ben & Jerry's in a unique
position within Unilever's corporate structure.256 Ben & Jerry's
2005, at 24, available at 2005 WLNR 5414311 [hereinafter M&A Case Study] (quoting Helen Jones). A
former executive at Unilever's advertising agency goes even further. "Today, the Unilever brand doesn't
fit well with the Ben & Jerry's experience. But the plan is that at some point in the future, the Unilever
brand will be an actual asset to a brand like Ben & Jerry's. . . ." Id. (quoting Ian Stephens).
248. Austin & Leonard, supra note 21, at 79. See also M&A Case Study, supra note 247 at 2.
("If you've heard the brand story behind Unilever recently, you'll have realized that its missions and
values are not so dissimilar to Ben & Jerry's.") (quoting Ian Stephens).
249. Marc Gunther, Ben & Jerry's Chills Ice Cream - and the Planet, FORTUNE, Oct. 22, 2008,
available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/22/technology/ben jerrys.fortune/index.htm. In order to use
the new freezers, Ben & Jerry's had to lobby the Environmental Protection Agency for permission. Id.
250. The company renamed its Chubby Hubby flavor Hubby Hubby to mark Vermont's passage
of a same sex marriage law. See Ben & Jerry's Renames Legendary Flavor to Celebrate Freedom to
Marry, BUSINEss WIRE (Sept. 1, 2009, 3:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20090901005358/en/Ben-Jerry's-Renames-Legendary-Flavor-Celebrate-Freedom.
251. Ben & Jerry's Goes Globally Nuts for Fair Trade, BUSINESS WIRE (Feb. 18, 2010, 12:00 PM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100218006252/en/Ben-Jerry's-Globally-Nuts-Fair-Trade.
252. See, e.g., Social & Environmental Assessment Report, BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE
CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/company/sear/2009/index.cfn (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (stating
that the company purchases carbon offsets for all carbon created at the Vermont plant).
253. Id
254. Entine, supra note 6. Entine also suggests that although the founders were good entrepreneurs,
it was their "bungling and mismanagement" that led to the takeover. Id. at 3.
255. Id.
256. M&A Case Study, supra note 247 ("[Ben & Jerry's] occupies a unique position within
[Unilever's] vast brand structure. It is part of the portfolio, yet the only brand exempt from carrying the
new Unilever branding on its packaging. It has a separate location from other companies in the portfolio
and is run as a distinct business unit.").
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undoubtedly increased the number of ice cream consumers willing to pay a
premium for ice cream made without bovine growth hormone, using dairy
from family farms, made in ways that promote rainforest preservation, and
that pays fair(er) wages to Third World suppliers of cocoa, vanilla, and
coffee.m Unilever has continued to operate within these parameters, even if
it has discarded some of Ben & Jerry's pro-social activities. The Ben &
Jerry's website suggests that not only is it still pursuing the same social
mission on a local and national level, but that with Unilever's acquisition,
the social mission can be carried out on a global scale. 258 This echoes
Cohen's claim during Ben & Jerry's early days that if the company were
bigger, it could do more good. 2 59 To the degree that these activities are part
of Ben & Jerry's pre-takeover social mission, the acquisition has
significantly enhanced that mission; Unilever helped Ben & Jerry's grow
more quickly, as they now sell three times more ice cream.2 60
Overall, the takeover of Ben & Jerry's suggests which pro-social
elements of a for-profit social enterprise are heartier and likely to persist
after its acquisition. These include the social value that an enterprise
"makes" rather than "buys." Those elements that are embedded in the
enterprise's production process are more likely to persist, as opposed to,
261*say, gifts made to existing charitable organizations. One example is Ben
& Jerry's innovation in controlling its waste output. In the late 1980s, the
company fed ice cream waste to pigs rather than further contaminating the
municipal water system. 2 62 Now, it sends ice-cream waste to a "Bio-
257. See BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/company/history/
(click on 1989 icon at bottom of screen) (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); BEN AND JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE
CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/activismlinside-the-pint/fair-trade/ (click on the corresponding icons
for Mexico, Cote D'Ivoire, Uganda, and Dominican Republic) (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
258. See, e.g., Unilever's Acquisition of Ben & Jerry's, BEN & JERRY'S CUSTOMER SUPPORT
(Mar. 5, 2010, 06:56 AM), http://benjerry.custhelp.com (follow "Find Answers" hyperlink; then search
for Answer ID "136") (concluding that Unilever's increased resources would allow Ben & Jerry's
mission to expand globally).
259. BAMBURGH, supra note 9, at 2.
260. Presumably, at least for public relations purposes, this is what the two founders hoped for
when they agreed to the sale. At the time they said "[n]either of us could have anticipated, twenty years
ago, that a major multinational would some day sign on, enthusiastically, to pursue and expand the
social mission that continues to be an essential part of Ben & Jerry's and a driving force behind our
many successes. But today, Unilever has done just that." Press Release, supra note 229.
261. John Peloza & Derek N. Hassay, Make Versus Buy Philanthropy: Managing Firm-Cause
Relationships for Strategic and Social Benefit, CIBC CENTRE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RISK
MANAGEMENT, at 7 (Winter 2006), http://business.sfu.calfiles/PDF/cibc-centre/ccgrm-hierarchy.pdf.
262. COHEN & GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 154. The pigs reportedly enjoyed all of the flavors
except mint Oreos.
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digester" which uses the "ice-creamy" waste to produce energy from
methane.263 The remaining solid leftovers are used as bedding for cows.264
Another example is its opposition to genetic modification. When
Unilever sought approval in England for a genetically-modified ingredient,
a Ben & Jerry's spokesperson declared, "We would not dream of including
anything like that in our products.... The fact that we are not using this
[genetically modified] ingredient shows that we are not following all of
their decisions." 2 6 5 A third example is Unilever's repeated commitment to
production in Vermont.266 Ben & Jerry's chief executive says keeping
production in Vermont is important because of "the history and the
authenticity of the culture and values."267 Perhaps this is no surprise, as Ben
& Jerry's was said to have "redefined corporate philanthropy" in going
beyond financial contribution to charity to its innovative product
practices.268
Even after the takeover, Ben & Jerry's styles itself and is perceived by
many as a socially-responsible corporation.269 As evidence of its relevance,
it continues to generate ideological opposition, among them "Star Spangled
Ice Cream," a conservative alternative to Ben & Jerry's that donates 10% of
its profits to pro-military organizations and sells flavors such as "Iraqui
Road," "Smaller Governmint," and "Nutty Environmentalist." 270  In
263. Environmental Waste, BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE ICE CREAM, http://www.benandjerrys.
com/activism/environmental/waste/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2010).
264. Id.
265. Jonathan Owen, Ben & Jerry's Breaks Ranks With Unilever Over 'Risky' GM Ice Cream
Additive, THE INDEPENDENT, July 16, 2006, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/be
n-amp-jerrys-breaks-ranks-with-unilever-over-risky-gm-ice-cream-additive408164.html.
266. Dan McLean, Ben & Jerry's New CEO Promises to Keep it in Vermont, USA TODAY, Mar.
24, 2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2010-03-24-ben-and-jenys-ceo-
solheimN.htm?csp"34&utm source=feedbuer&utm medium-feed&utm campaign=Feed%3A+Usat
odaycomMoney-TopStories+%28Money+-+Top+Stories%29.
267. Id.
268. Caring Capitalists, supra note 25.
269. See, e.g., Dan Mitchell, Cuts, Cream, Claus and Cofee, N.Y. TfMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at Cl,
available at htt//www.nytimes.com2005/12/10/technology/0online.ready.html?scp-86&s=/o22ben+%26
+Jeny%27s%22&st=nyt (reporting that "Ben & Jerry's... casts itself as a force for good by using organic
ingredients, giving pmfits to social causes and treating its employees well"). See also Gen Y's Totally Trusted
Brands, THE OUTLAW, http//www.outlawnewsletter.com/newsletters/the-brand-issue#section1 (last visited
Apr. 25, 2010) (reporting that Ben & Jerry's made the top fifteen list for Generation Y's most trusted brands).
Of course, one reason for this may be that many consumers do not realize that Ben & Jeny's is owned by a
multinational. See, e.g., Judy Rambert & Katie Anderson, Stealth Branding andAuthenticity: How Companies
Can Keep it Real, ICONOCULIURE, Feb. 2008, available at http://www.iconoculture.com/icopws/groups/public
website/documents/web_content/pws 002072.pdf (claiming that "most fans would be shocked to leam" that
Ben & Jerry's, an "authentic" brand, was actually owned by Unilever).
270. See STAR SPANGLED ICE CREAM, www.starspangledicecream.com (last visited Apr. 27,
2010).
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addition, Ben & Jerry's was targeted by PETA (People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals) for its "Breast is Best" campaign.2 7 1
Contrast this to the social value that Ben & Jerry's created by making
corporate donations to charities.272 These activities, which were tangential
to the company's production process, were more readily discarded.27' This
may be why Cohen is no longer involved with the company,274 and why
Greenfield believes that Ben & Jerry's is just "a clone of its giant owner."275
Even a Ben & Jerry's spokesperson acknowledged the difficulty: "One of
the biggest problems is that we are affected by Unilever's actions even
though they are [sic] nothing to do with the way that we behave."2 76 This
may be false if Unilever is now running Ben & Jerry's just like any other
profit-maximizing firm. On the other hand, if Ben & Jerry's securities
filings are correct, its social mission always contributed to its financial
performance.277
Ben & Jerry's has continued to contribute to a social mission, albeit in
different ways than it would have done had it stayed independent. The
takeover, while perhaps worse than staying independent, has by no means
been a disaster. Greenfield and Cohen now say that Unilever "generally has
been good about pursuing a social mission, but could have been better."278
For those who support what Ben & Jerry's remains committed to, the
takeover may in fact have been positive.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD?
The Ben & Jerry's experience, properly understood, offers several
lessons for scholars and practitioners of for-profit social enterprise. These
271. PETA argues that Ben & Jerry's should switch to using human breast milk for its ice cream
to prevent unnecessary cruelty to dairy cattle. The Breast is Best! PETA Asks Ben & Jerry's to Dump
Dairy and Go With Human Milk Instead, PETA (Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.peta.org/mc/newsitem.aspi
d=1 1993.
272. See generally, Social & Environmental Assessment Reports, BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE
ICE CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/company/sear/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2010) (reporting all donations
to charities from 1999-2000).
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lessons, however, should not be derived from the frequently retold story of
the forced fall from grace of an iconic social enterprise.
Contrary to the oft-repeated assertions, corporate law did not dictate
the sale of Ben & Jerry's to Unilever. The law of publicly-traded
corporations is sufficiently flexible to enable the creation of a double
bottom line enterprise that is largely immune from takeover, thereby
preserving control in the founders' mission-friendly hands. Cohen and
Greenfield took some permissible steps early on that either allowed, or with
some simple tweaking, would have allowed them to fend off Unilever's
offer. Granted, the corporate form itself may predispose some corporate
managers to see shareholder wealth maximization as a suitable aim. Yet as
Ben & Jerry's demonstrates, a for-profit corporation can espouse and foster
a very different culture and set of norms.
It is one thing to protect a for-profit social enterprise from being taken
over by unfriendly outsiders. It is a different and perhaps more difficult task
to construct an organizational form strong enough to withstand changes
over time in the founders' preference or values. Some proponents of new
legal forms for hybrid ventures invoke the Ben & Jerry's experience to
garner support for such forms.279 Such claims are flawed. There may be
good reasons to create such forms, but preventing another Ben & Jerry's is
not one of them.
Even so, the Ben & Jerry's experience invites other social
entrepreneurs to consider whether and how to use organizational law to
protect their enterprise's social mission not only from hostile acquirers, but
also from their future preferences, which might be less idealistic and
altruistic than their present selves. 280 The traditional way to perpetuate an
enterprise's mission-driven focus is to set it up as a nonprofit organization,
which permanently dedicates the nonprofit's surplus to legally charitable
purposes. 281 The asset lock imposed by nonprofit law (a.k.a. the
"nondistribution constraint") prohibits the organization's controllers from
distributing its surplus to themselves, except for reasonable compensation
for goods and services rendered.282 When a social entrepreneur organizes
279. See, e.g., Dembosky, supra note 3.
280. See generally, Richard H. Thaler & H. M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory ofSelf-Control, 89
J. POL. EcoN. 392, 394 (1981) (proposing a model which explains why individuals change economic
preferences over time by acknowledging "man as having two sets of preferences that are in conflict at a
single point in time").
28 1. See generally, Diana Ransom, Starting Up: Nonprofit Vs. For-Projit Social Ventures (June
17, 2008), http://www.smsmallbiz.com/bestpractices/startingup upNonprofit vs ForProfitSocial_
Ventures.html (stating that traditional nonprofits are more common).
282. See Robert Katz & Antony Page, supra note 208, at 67-68 (explaining nondistribution
constraint).
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her enterprise on a nonprofit basis, she thereby constrains her future self
from appropriating its surplus for her personal benefit. Proponents of new
legal forms of for-profit social enterprises thus pose a good question: can
we devise forms that enable founders to more firmly commit themselves to
pursuing a double bottom line in the long term?
Lastly, the Ben & Jerry's experience points to potential drawbacks to
efforts to entrench a for-profit firm's social mission and suggests some
larger lessons in social entrepreneurship. Even if a hybrid entity is taken
over by a profit-maximizing company, the entity can leave an enduring
legacy of social progress. From a broader, macro-economic perspective,
Ben & Jerry's acquisition by Unilever may not be undesirable, and perhaps
should even be celebrated. Ben & Jerry's effected important changes in the
ice cream market: it identified and developed a neglected market niche for
"socially conscious" ice cream, by demonstrating that substantial numbers
of consumers place a high value on social and environmental practices. It
thus helped bring about a new, more pro-social equilibrium in the ice cream
market-one that generates greater social value and fewer negative
externalities than the status quo. Unilever, by expanding the market that
Ben & Jerry's pioneered, may have created more social value than Ben &
Jerry's could have done alone.
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